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Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence 
from the Past Decade and a Cross-national Comparison 
 
Jiri VECERNIK* 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Through ownership restructuring and the liberalization of labor contracts, economic reforms 
in the Czech Republic since 1989 have profoundly affected earnings distribution. Continuing our 
previous research (Vecernik, 1991, 1995), we here offer a more contemporary depiction of earnings 
disparities and causality. To what degree have the returns to education increased and work incentives 
strengthened, and to what extent has the Czech wage structure approached those of advanced 
capitalist countries regarding disparities and the causes thereof. Unfortunately, few of these questions 
can be answered to any degree, as the database of wage surveys is rather limited and only a few 
variables can be analyzed in a consistent cross-time and cross-national comparison. 
In the first part of this study, we look at the present level of wage inequality in the Czech 
Republic and observe the main factors of disparity. In the second part, we present evidence toward a 
cross-national comparative analysis. We document that (1) the introduction of a market economy led 
to significant increases in earnings disparities; (2) the “communist demographic” determination 
of earnings is being replaced by the capitalist characteristics of workers in the new market economy; 
(3) previously socialist preferences for the secondary sector are disappearing in the economy in favor 
of the better wage position of the service (tertiary) sector, however uneven among branches; (4) while 
political privileges are disappearing, ownership disparities become important; and (5) the earnings 
structure approaches models characteristic for Western countries. 
Throughout the text, we try to capture change in earnings distribution qualitatively and 
systemically. This is tentatively summarized in Schema 1. It suggests that the whole context 
of earnings disparities is changing, starting with the general economic goal that proceeds from so-
called extensive growth with little regard to costs to so-called intensive growth involving much better 
use of resources, including human capital. Instead of communist equalization where little disparities 
reflected mostly the reproduction costs of workers (with the main attention to heavy manual work), 
market differences appear which reflect better individual contribution to productivity of labor and 
efficiency of production. However, no radical breaks have occurred in fact – the two columns 
of Schema 1 depict model pictures representing approximation of much more complicated and blurred 
reality. 
 
2.  Earnings disparities in economic transition 
The transition to a market economy has opened great opportunities for private entrepreneurship, 
employment in foreign firms, and higher earnings for higher managerial positions. High earnings were 
accorded to employees in finance and in the top echelons of the state bureaucracy. The possibility was 
opened for rewarding work differently according to skills and performance. Newly established and 
foreign firms have had greater liberty in wage settings, and attract highly skilled people by offering 
considerably higher wages. Job mobility increased as individuals found better-remunerated jobs, were 
promoted in de novo private firms or sought work abroad. After state wage regulations were removed, 
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formerly state-owned companies also began to have greater discretion in compensating their 
employees. All of this contributed to a general de-equalizing trend in wages. 
 
SCHEMA 1 Earning disparities under a command and a market economy 
 
Characteristic 
 
Command economy  Market economy  
General economic goal  
 
Amount of product (high-
costs growth) 
Productivity, efficiency (low-
costs growth) 
Generator of inequality  The state and (marginally) 
the labor market 
The labor market and 
(considerably) the state 
Distribution according to  Basic needs, loyalty to the 
regime 
Skills, performance, network 
visibility 
Main factors of disparities  Gender, age, hard manual 
labor  
Human capital,  
entrepreneurship  
The role of education State investment generating 
small disparities  
Individual investment 
generating large disparities 
The role of age  Generation, accumulated 
loyalty (linear increase)  
Career, accumulated 
experience (curvilinear) 
Preferred branches  
 
Mining, metallurgy,  
heavy manufacturing 
Finance, top technologies, 
professional services 
Managerial premiums given for  Political position,  
risk aversion 
Innovation,  
risk taking 
Public/private sector distinction  
 
No  Important  
 
 
The rise in disparities was attenuated by some adverse measures. A previously non-existent 
national minimum wage was set by the state in 1991 and increased soon thereafter. However, it was 
subsequently kept frozen until 2000, when the current Social Democratic government ruled that the 
minimum wage had crossed below the official subsistence minimum for an individual adult. Wage 
growth continued to be state controlled until 1992, when wages were partially liberalized, but 
regulation remains, though in a less-strict manner, for state-owned firms. After a lack of any control in 
the beginning of 1993, tax-based wage regulation was re-introduced, but then completely removed 
again in 1995. The fact that the conduct of firms has not changed since 1995 may attest to the 
uselessness of this manner of wage restraint (Flek, 1996). 
 
2.1  Empirical evidence 
The most obvious data source on earnings are wage statistics based on surveys of firms. The 
coverage of these surveys has changed over time. Until 1992, only companies with 100 or more 
employees were included; since 1992, the coverage was expanded to firms with +25 employees and, 
since 1997, firms with +20 employees were included. Banking and insurance and public organizations 
were included without employee limits. Whereas between 1993 and 1995 information on wage 
distribution was estimated combining various sources, in 1996 and 1997 wage surveys were again 
collected as a sample survey for units with 1-999 employees, with full coverage of larger 
organizations following the recommendations of Eurostat, the statistical office of the European 
Commission. Since 1998, the database of Information System on Average Wage, administered by the 
Trexima company for the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, has been used 
instead of wage surveys. 
Wage statistics produced by or under the auspices of the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) are 
surely the best source for presenting basic figures on changes in earnings disparities over time. 
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However, given our main focus on distribution issues and the effort to identify various factors 
affecting wage distribution, we need to use micro data toward original analyses. For our purpose, 
the best source are the “personal” files ofCSO household income surveys – Microcensuses – from 
the years 1988, 1992 and 1996. Their advantage is that they are conducted on large samples 
representative of the entire population. The disadvantage, however, is that they do not include 
important variables such as industry or occupation, except for the 1996 survey. An additional problem 
is that, whereas before 1989 wage data were provided by employers, they are reported by individual 
respondents thereafter. 
The dependent variable in our analyses is earnings, meaning all forms of wage and salary 
incomes from dependent labor gross of employee taxes but net of employer taxes. In some explicit 
cases, we also include self-employed earnings. Such a definition of earnings conforms 
to the Luxembourg Income Study definition, as per Smeeding and Coder (1993), which is then suitable 
for cross-national comparisons. For the sake of comparability with wage statistics and over time, we 
limit our analysis of Microcensus data concerning the full-time labor force by excluding cooperative 
farmers. This latter group was never included in wage surveys and was exempted from wage taxes 
under the communist regime, and largely disappeared after 1989. 
For some additional variables and questions, we also use sociological surveys. For the early 
phase of transition, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 is sometimes used (Chase, 
1998) (Vecernik, 1996). For longitudinal observation, the 1990–1998 series Economic Expectations 
and Attitudes (EEA) can serve as in some surveys a set of employment variables is included, such as 
ownership status and firm size, trade union membership and secondary jobs, etc. (Flanagan, 1995) 
(Vecernik, 1996) (Lorenz – Hraba – Pechacova, 1999). More focused are the 1992 and 1999 ISSP 
modules in Social Inequalities, also including a retrospective self-assessment on income position. Yet 
another is the survey SIALS (Second International Adult Literacy Surveys), which adds literacy skills 
to a standard human capital set of variables (Vecernik, 1999). 
 
2.2  Overall inequality 
All available data confirm that, since 1989, earnings inequality has risen. According to wage 
surveys, the decile ratio rose throughout 1989–1999, from 2.45 to 2.8, i.e., by 14 percent. According 
to Microcensus data, the decile ratio increased in 1988-1996 from 2.44 to 3.11, i.e., by 27 percent. 
However, we have to bear in mind that the decile ratio, which is the ratio of the lower-bound value 
of the tenth decile of wage distribution to the upper-bound value of the first decile, does not take into 
account the earnings of the lowest and highest 10 percent of earners. If we relate the averages of the 
upper and lower ten percent, then the ratio appears even higher and the change over time becomes 
more important. Various sources converge to an estimate of 6:1 as the ratio of the high-to-low average 
income decile in the mid-1990s, which is almost twice that of 1989 (Table 1). 
Statistical evidence on the inequality of earnings after 1989 is not unambiguous. According 
to wage statistics, the widening of disparities occurred differently in various periods. Whereas up 
to 1992 the fastest changes were associated with high-wage categories, which moved upwards, after 
1992 low wages began to move downward. However, neither statistical wage surveys conducted later 
nor sociological surveys confirm a considerable drop of low-wage categories in relative terms. What 
is certainly sure is that the top category of income distribution has considerably increased while the 
bottom income category was stable or only slowly rising. This means that differences in the middle 
of earnings distribution relatively narrowed and the bulk of income disparities remained compressed. 
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Table 1 Distribution of earnings by deciles (percentage and coefficients) 
 
Deciles 
and 
 
Wage statistics 
 
Microcensus 
 
EEA 
coefficie
nts 
gross wage gross earnings net earnings 
 1989 1993 1997 1999 1988 1992 1996 1993 1996 1998 
1 4.7 4.4 4.6 4.4 5.3 5.0 3.9 4.8 4.4 4.3 
2 6.5 5.6 5.9 5.8 6.6 6.1 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.2 
3 7.3 6.6 6.9 6.7 7.4 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.2 
4 8.2 7.4 7.7 7.5 8.3 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.1 7.2 
5 9.1 8.4 8.5 8.3 9.2 8.5 8.4 8.1 7.9 7.9 
6 10.1 9.4 9.3 9.1   10.0 9.4 9.4 9.0 8.8 9.0 
7  11.0 10.7 10.2 10.1   10.9   10.4 10.4   10.5   10.0   10.1 
8  12.2 12.2 11.0 11.4   12.0   11.7 11.8   12.1   11.4   11.8 
9  13.7 14.6 13.1 13.8   13.3   13.8 14.1   14.1   14.3   14.2 
10  17.2 20.7 22.8 22.9   17.0   20.5 22.4   22.2   24.5   24.1 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Ratio 
10:1    3.7   4.7 5.0 5.2     3.2   4.1 5.7   4.6  5.6  5.6 
Robin 
Hood 
Index   14.1   18.2 17.1 18.2   13.2   16.4 18.7   18.9  20.2  20.2 
Coeffici
ent Gini  -   - - -   0.19   0.23 0.24   0.25   0.27   0.27 
 
Sources: Microcensus 1989, 1992 and 1996; Wage surveys 1989-1997; EEA January 1993 and 1996, and April 1998.  
Note: Net earnings according to EEA surveys also include self-employed persons. 
 
 
The change in the overall range of earnings informs us about the abstract “space 
of inequality,” but not about the concrete disparities themselves, their meanings and their factors. 
A more important question than how large the differences in earnings are is how they actually work 
within the labor market and business environment in rewarding various aspects of jobs and workers. 
A related question is in which direction are the concrete differences moving. Unfortunately, such 
a picture can be presented in much fewer dimensions that we would wish and need, given the limited 
availability of worker characteristics in wage statistics and income surveys. 
 
2.3  Demographic factors 
The weak status of skilled labor, the dominance of political criteria and the application 
of the “needs principle” under the communist regime in Czechoslovakia resulted in the far greater 
prevalence of demographic characteristics of workers over economic ones in determining the level 
of earnings. Particularly in the free-market Czech Republic, gender was the main variable of wage 
disparities. Age was also important because of the coincidence of its generational and career 
meanings. The founders of the communist regime, a young generation in 1948, were treated 
preferentially their whole lives. Further, older age served as a “special qualification” for top 
management. Unlike gender and age, skills and job requirements were less important (Vecernik, 
1991). 
Regression analyses of 1988 and 1996 data document the extensive or even revolutionary 
changes in the earnings structure (Tables 2a and 2b). While in 1988, gender explained 30.5 percent 
of the variance of earnings, its weight dropped to 12.6 percent by 1996. This obviously does not mean 
that the gender wage gap decreased that dramatically, but it suggests that the importance of this 
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dimension has diminished in the context of a thoroughly changing earnings structure. Also, the weight 
of the age variable (5-year categories) halved and the total weight of demographic characteristics 
(gender and age together) decreased from 40 to 17 percent. In contrast, the explanatory power of 
education (measured crudely by four types of highest degree achieved) has increased from 11 to 
almost 20 percent. This suggests that in a relatively short time span, education became the paramount 
factor in earnings variance. 
TABLE 2a  Regression analysis of (ln) earnings by gender, age and education: non-standardized 
coefficients 
 
1988     1996 Independent 
variable 1 2 1 2 
Gender (men) 0.380 0.366 0.358 0.369 
AgeAAge Age:      
25–29  0.139 0.109 0.177 0.108 
30–34 0.223 0.203 0.225 0.154 
35–39 0.274 0.264 0.251 0.194 
40–44 0.315 0.304 0.256 0.222 
45–49  0.317 0.308 0.257 0.223 
50–54 0.316 0.316 0.254 0.211 
55–59 0.246 0.245 0.192 0.149 
60– 0.055 0.059 0.174 0.295 
Education:     
vocational  0.060  0.157 
secondary  0.143  0.421 
university  0.329  0.746 
Intercept 8.212 8.103 9.433 9.211 
Adjusted R2  0.398 0.475 0.172 0.365 
 
Sources: Microcensus 1989 and 1996. 
Notes: Omitted categories: age -25; elementary education. 
All coefficients significant on the level < 0.001.  
 
 
TABLE 2b  Regression analysis of (ln) earnings by gender, age and education: summary 
of adjusted R2 
 
1988      1996 Independent 
variable univariate additive univariate additive 
Both genders 
Sex 0.305 0.305 0.126 0.126 
Age 0.078 0.398 0.036 0.172 
Education  0.111 0.475 0.195 0.365 
Men 
Age 0.159 0.159 0.073 0.073 
Education  0.096 0.244 0.210 0.267 
Women 
Age 0.112 0.112 0.040 0.040 
Education  0.145 0.276 0.247 0.293 
 
Sources: Microcensus 1989 and 1996. 
Note: All coefficients significant on the level < 0.001. 
 
A regression analysis separate for men and women shows some dissimilarities. The weight 
of age is still somewhat greater among men than women, while education is somewhat more important 
for women than men. Both demographic factors taken together determine women’s earnings more 
than men’s. By comparing sums of univariate R2 with the multivariate additive results, we see that 
among men, the former is higher than the latter, whereas the opposite is true with women. Also, 
results of the SIALS survey support the hypothesis that while, with men, characteristics of education 
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and experience function relatively separately and, therefore, one could be then replaced by the other, 
both job requirements shall be met by women simultaneously. 
Unfortunately, available data do not allow more detailed study, such as concretely indicating 
which characteristics of workers actually fill up the space left by the decreasing effects of gender and 
age, which are not fully compensated by the increasing effect of education. We might speculate that 
instead of being determined by demographic characteristics, earnings are more determined by 
occupation, industry and the sector of ownership. This cannot be analyzed on homogeneous data 
across time, because the variable occupation based on the first two-digits of the ISCO code 
(28 categories), as well as detailed variable of industry, were included only in the 1996 survey. 
The only way to recover this deficiency is to use retrospective information, such as Daniel Munich, 
Jan Svejnar and Katherine Terrell provided (1999). However, income retrospect can be biased by 
(the usual) overestimation of past earnings and underestimation of current earnings. 
 
2.4  Returns to education and experience 
According to the theory of human capital, education and experience determine 
the productivity of labor and, consequently, worker’s earnings (Becker, 1964). From this point 
of view, communist Czechoslovakia was among those countries where the importance of education 
was the most downgraded. This was true not only in comparison with the advanced West, but also 
with other Central and East European (CEE) countries. After a period unfriendly to the evaluation 
of human capital and to investment into it, one can expect a reactionary effect and a rapid increase 
of rewards to those with higher levels of education, despite the problematic nature of skills and 
diplomas received during the communist era. 
Disparities according to education have increased significantly during the transformation 
period. Relative to the average, workers with only an elementary education (which is a rapidly 
disappearing category) saw a decline from 90 to 70 percent of the average in 1988–1996 while 
university-educated workers strengthened their wage position from 134 in 1988 to 165 percent 
in 1996. The range of disparities between workers with an elementary and with a university education 
for both genders increased from 1.48 to 2.37 in the same period, and was somewhat higher for men 
than for women in 1996. The greatest absolute and relative increase was registered by both men and 
women with university education (Table 3). 
To measure changing return to education and experience according to a standard procedure, 
we use Mincerian equations (Mincer, 1974), written as: 
ln(y) = b0+ b1s + b2e +b3e2 
where ln(y) = natural logarithm of earnings, s = years of schooling and  e= years of experience. 
As usual, the schooling variable is calculated by taking the years needed on average to get the degree 
reported in the survey, while experience is calculated as age minus schooling minus six. In order to 
distinguish among returns of various educational levels we use another equation in the form: 
ln(y) = b0 + b1sv + b2ss + b3su + b4e + b5e2 
where b1sv = dummy for vocational training, b2ss dummy for high school and b3 = dummy for 
university education, with elementary education as an omitted category. 
We have to note that over the actual lifetimes of the individuals surveyed in the sample, 
the education system was repeatedly restructured. To homogenize various systems of schooling, we 
thus averaged elementary education (the reference group) as corresponding to eight years 
of compulsory schooling from the age of six, followed either by vocational school (three years) 
or secondary school (four years) and university (another four to five years). The data do not 
distinguish post-graduate university qualifications, which are uncommon. All earnings functions are 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
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TABLE 3  Earnings by education and gender (percent of the average) 
Level of  Both genders Men Women 
education 1988 1992 1996 1988 1992 1996 1988 1992 1996 
Elementary   90.5 75.7 69.6 90.5 81.0 73.0 93.1 80.3 74.6 
Vocational   95.4 92.9 87.6 95.4 90.3 85.9 93.9 85.2 81.8 
Secondary 101.4 103.7 106.9 102.2 104.5 110.3 104.3 112.6 112.7 
University 134.0 144.0 164.7 124.6 140.0 161.3 133.1 145.4 160.7 
Average 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
In % of total 100.0 100.0 100.0 115.3 119.3 116.4 79.6 77.8 81.7 
Ratio 
univ/elem 
 
    1.48 
 
1.90 
 
2.37 
 
   1.38 
 
1.72 
 
2.21 
 
    1.43 
 
1.81 
 
2.15 
 
Sources: Microcensus 1989, 1992 and 1996. 
 
 
At the end of the communist era, one year of schooling increased men’s earnings by 
4.0 percent and women’s earnings by 5.1 percent. In 1992, this figure increased to 6.1 percent for men 
and 8.0 for women; in 1996, the return amounted to 8.3 percent for men and 9.4 for women. 
Simultaneously, the effect of experience (years on the job) on earnings was stagnating. Whereas in 
1988 the effect of experience (or, rather, the joint effect of a person’s age and his/her generation 
demographic) were nearly as strong as those of education for men, education clearly dominated over 
experience in 1996 (Table 4). 
Our results are basically consistent with other observations. According to Filer, Jurajda and 
Planovsky (1999), who used a database of firms, return to education for men in the Czech Republic 
amounted to 8.1 percent in 1995 and 9.0 in 1997. However, according to Munich, Svejnar and Terrell 
(1999), who used a special survey that reached households containing 4,700 individuals in the labor 
force, the return to education in 1996 amounted only to 5.8 percent for men and 7.0 for women, which 
is rather low, and which is close to the Microcensus figures for 1992. The underestimation 
of disparities according to education are otherwise quite common also in sociological surveys where 
people tend to respond by estimating net rather than gross earnings, even if they are asked for 
the latter. 
 
2.5  Earnings by industry  
After 1989, regressive changes occurred in agriculture, manufacturing and transport 
industries. The position of the service branches, however, improved somewhat. Trade and catering, 
health and social services slightly improved their earnings positions, while education, research and 
culture stagnated. The most apparent change is in the expansion of the banking sector, which 
advanced considerably by utilizing all possible means, even by paying penalties for overstepping the 
limit of allowed wage increases. In the last two years, health services, education and administration 
experienced several wage fluctuations: they improved their position slightly in the early 1990s, but 
then slid backwards again, reaching their lowest figures in 1998; in 1999, they almost recovered their 
1997 positions due to a substantial increase in the tariff wages of the public sector (Table 5). 
Generally speaking, wage shifts according to industry led to the diminishing significance 
of this dimension of income distribution relative to others; there are certainly much more intra- than 
inter-branch disparities in income at present than previous to 1989. Earnings differences by branch 
of employment remain important despite the fact that a significant equalization of the former 
disparities has occurred. Moreover, as we stated above, available statistics do not present all changes 
in branch disparities, because the data collected did not include small firms until 1996. 
TABLE 4  Returns to education: non-standardized beta coefficients (dependent variable ln gross 
earnings) 
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Category and 
variable  
 
   1988 
 
1992 
 
1996 
 
1988 
 
1992 
 
1996 
BOTH 
GENDERS 
      
Years of school   0.044  0.069  0.088    
Experience   0.028  0.032  0.032 0.028 0.033 0.033 
Experience 
squared/100   
-0.059 -0.063 -0.066 -0.059 -0.064 -0.066 
Sex  -0.358 -0.408 -0.350 -0.362 -0.421 -0.367 
Intercept  7.692  7.738  8.341 8.072 8.319 9.077 
Education:       
vocational  - - - 0.054 0.102 0.138 
secondary  - - - 0.151 0.317 0.406 
university  - - - 0.381 0.576 0.737 
Adjusted R2  0.465 0.384 0.362 0.466 0.390 0.369 
MEN       
Years of school   0.040  0.061  0.083    
Experience   0.034  0.044  0.037 0.038 0.044 0.037 
Experience 
squared/100   
-0.074 -0.092 -0.077 -0.082 -0.092 -0.077 
Intercept   8.071  7.331  8.005 7.634 7.834 8.659 
Education:       
vocational  - - - 0.043 0.098 0.166 
secondary  - - - 0.124 0.260 0.391 
university  - - - 0.339 0.525 0.731 
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.222 0.274 0.264 0.224 0.278 
WOMEN       
Years of school  0.051 0.080 0.094    
Experience  0.022 0.017 0.027 0.022 0.017 0.027 
Experience 
squared/100   
-0.038 -0.022 -0.054 -0.038 -0.022 -0.054 
Intercept  6.922 6.904 7.614 7.358 7.560 8.390 
Education:       
vocational     0.055 0.096 0.107 
secondary     0.182 0.370 0.421 
university     0.453 0.642 0.757 
Adjusted R2  0.264 0.249 0.267 0.268 0.268 0.278 
 
Sources: Microcensus 1989, 1992 and 1996. 
Note: All coefficients significant on the level < 0.001  
 
While we cannot compare the changing weight of industry dispersion over time, we can 
at least observe it in comparison with other characteristics of workers in 1996. Regression analysis 
in Table 6 measures the weight of branch disparities themselves and additively to other variables, 
following our previous analysis in Tables 2a and 2b. The sole industry variable (containing ten 
branches) explains about five percent of all workers’ and men’s earnings variance, but as much 
as nine percent of women’s earnings variance – for women it is therefore much more important in 
which branch they are employed. If added to the previously analyzed variables (gender, age and 
education), branch disparities can explain an additional three percent for both genders and for men, 
and four percent for women. 
TABLE 5 Earnings by industry of employment (percent of the average)  
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Industry  1989 1990    1991  1992   1993  1994  1995  1996     1997    1998    1999 
Manufacturing 104.4 103.8 103.6   103.5 101.3  99.9 99.7   99.1 100.5 101.4 100.1 
Construction 111.2 109.9 106.6   108.2 112.3 110.6 108.1 105.1 104.9 103.3 100.6 
Agriculture 108.2 109.6 97.7    91.8   87.7   85.0   84.2   80.7   79.5   78.9   75.9 
Transport and 
communications
 
106.4 
 
104.6 
 
103.2 
 
   99.1 
 
  97.5 
  
  98.7 
 
100.8 
 
101.8 
 
105.8 
 
108.1 
 
107.8 
Trade and 
catering 
  83.8 85.0 86.2    90.1   88.6   91.6   88.4   87.8   98.1   98.2   97.6 
Health care and 
welfare services 
  90.1 92.6 96.6    94.5   95.0   93.9   92.1   93.7   90.0   85.1   89.4 
Education   89.8 88.1 90.3    90.6   90.3   91.7   90.9   92.9   88.1   84.2   87.5 
Banking 
and insurance 
 
98.3 
 
102.0 
 
136.9 
 
  169.6 
 
177.7 
 
175.2 
 
171.5 
 
169.6 
 
174.5 
 
181.0 
 
181.7 
Administration  
and defense 
 
101.3 
 
100.4 
 
105.3 
 
  114.6 
 
117.8 
 
120.7 
 
117.6 
 
118.3 
 
110.2 
 
103.1 
 
107.8 
Average 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks 
 
TABLE 6  Regression analysis of (ln) earnings by industry: non-standardized coefficient beta before 
and after controlling for gender, age and education in 1996 
 
 Industry  Before controlling After controlling 
 Both 
genders 
Men Women Both 
genders 
Men Women 
Manufacturing 0.196 0.169 0.110 0.210 0.237 0.174 
Construction 0.270 0.107 0.269 0.187 0.196 0.172 
Agriculture 0.046 -0.043 0.023 0.055 0.040 0.090 
Transport and 
communica-
tion 
 
 
0.242 
 
 
0.143 
 
 
0.232 
 
 
0.213 
 
 
0.203 
 
 
0.242 
Trade and 
catering 
 
0.094 
 
0.183 
 
0.076 
 
0.162 
 
0.209 
 
0.129 
Health and 
welfare 
 
0.141 
 
0.200 
 
0.247 
 
0.156 
 
0.098 
 
0.152 
Education 0.180 0.295 0.252 0.064 0.047 0.052 
Banking 
and insurance 
 
0.707 
 
0.796 
 
0.734 
 
0.587 
 
0.569 
0.584 
Administration  
and defense 
 
0.372 
 
0.340 
 
0.367 
 
0.244 
 
0.249 
0.237 
Intercept 8.911 9.100 8.748 9.015 8.606 8.371 
Adjusted R2  0.053 0.056 0.091 0.395 0.299 0.335 
Source: Microcensus 1996 
 
 
2.6  Political factors and ownership 
In the communist regime, political factors exerted a comprehensive influence on earnings. 
First, they conditioned one’s educational level (through controlled access to secondary and, 
in particular, university education). Secondly, they had a considerable influence on job searches, both 
through informal social networks and formal channels to managerial positions in low-level 
organizations and, almost all, positions in high-level organizations. Third, the application of higher 
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wage tariffs or higher premiums privileged party members over non-members, even when occupying 
the same positions. Under the ceteris paribus condition, the residual premium of party membership 
on earnings amounted to 10 percent in 1984, according to a social stratification survey of the time 
(Vecernik, 1996, p. 57). 
The political dimension of earnings rapidly disappeared in the early transition, although not 
completely – skills and knowledge formerly acquired in politically determined positions became 
a precious “social capital” to be used in top jobs in new private business and foreign companies under 
market conditions (the first expert engaged by a foreign company after 1989 was the previous 
communist minister of foreign trade). As Bogdan W. Mach observed for Poland, “…political 
segmentation of the former state-socialist labor market exerts a strong influence on individuals’ 
placement in the current capitalist market. We discovered that the former middle managerial statuses 
and not top or lower managerial positions can be effectively exchanged for advantaged positions 
under the new system – especially for the status of an owner and for greater economic well-being” 
(Mach, 2000, p. 33). 
In the transition period, the political dimension was in some sense “replaced” by differences 
according to ownership status. Unfortunately, there is no variable in statistical income surveys 
(including the 1996 Microcensus) that would enable us to add this dimension to a variance analysis 
of earnings. The CSO only calculates one-way averages of wages according to ownership sector and 
such variables are thus available only in special wage or sociological surveys. 
The CSO has published wage statistics according to economic sector since 1995. Most 
differences in earnings are, however, hidden by the categorization used. According to the 1999 
results, only a negligible number of workers were employed in state-owned production firms, but 
these workers had substantially higher wages than those in the private business sector. On the whole, 
there is almost no substantial difference between the domestic private and state sectors (both 
displaying about 95 percent of the average), while earnings in companies where there is foreign-
capital participation are much higher: 132 percent of the average in foreign firms (about 150,000 
workers), 128 percent in international firms (200,000 workers) and 116 percent in mixed firms 
(500,000 workers) were reported in the statistical wage survey in 1999 (Wage differentiation 2000). 
However, wage averages do not answer the question of how ownership education is rewarded 
in various sectors. Processing individual data, Filer, Jurajda and Planovsky (1999) distinguished 
among private, state and foreign firms in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1995-1997. They found 
that a university degree was best remunerated in the private sector throughout the whole period. 
Rather unexpectedly, the least profitable workplaces for employees with a diploma were foreign-
owned firms. General and specialized secondary education is better rewarded in private domestic than 
in foreign firms, but its position in both is improving over time. In state organizations, specialized 
secondary education is much better paid than the secondary general. The explanation probably lies 
in the contrast between professional public services (such as education and health care) and simple 
administrative jobs. 
According to Munich, Svejnar and Terrell, who analyzed a survey of households conducted in 
1999, returns to education in individual sectors differ yet again by gender. Whereas for men the most 
profitable jobs were in privatized firms (6.5 percent), secondly in de novo firms (6.1 percent), and last 
in state-owned enterprises (5.6 percent); for women the most advantageous were de novo firms 
(8.1 percent), followed by privatized firms (7.0 percent), and last, again, were state-owned enterprises 
(6.3 percent). It is interesting that wages in the de novo firms were most determined by education 
and experience (R2 = 0.247 for men and 0.352 for women), although here we might rather expect 
the greatest liberty in wage settings, which also accounts for not-measured skills and abilities. It 
seems that these firms did not share the overwhelming enthusiasm for young workers apparent during 
most of 1990s. 
Even in the post-privatization period since the mid-1990s, some differences according 
to education between state, private domestic and foreign firms remain important. However, a thorough 
analysis of the ownership dimension of earnings disparities would require a better categorization than 
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is provided by statistical surveys. At least, we should be able to distinguish production firms that have 
remained in state hands from public service institutions, as well as differentiating foreign-owned firms 
from the first phase of transition (restructured from the very beginning) from firms bought by foreign 
companies in later phases (after the urgent need of a strategic investor has appeared). We also shall 
distinguish privatized formerly state-owned firms from de novo small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). 
Such variables were basically described in sociological surveys, but the samples used are 
rather small. The 1998 EEA survey documents, for instance, the wage dominance of privatized firms 
over not-yet-privatized and a greater variability of earnings in the private sector. The 1999 ISSP 
survey shows the superiority of rewards in foreign-owned firms and the inferiority of earnings in the 
public sector, after controlling for gender and education. However, we can hardly expect a completely 
consistent hierarchy ranking wage disparities following their degree of marketization – for instance, 
from the not-yet-privatized state enterprises at the wage bottom to foreign-owned companies at 
the top, with various transitory ownership forms in between. The situation is quickly changing with 
the restructuring process. 
 
3.  Cross-national comparison 
Given that changes in earnings range and structure also contribute to the trajectory 
of the country to a standard market economy, a question arises: how large is the distance that remains 
between the Czech wage structure and that in Western countries, and how does this distance differ in 
various regards? Trying to answer this, we face two difficulties: First, there is no “standard” market 
economy, but rather national market economies, each with many specificities. Second, there is no all-
inclusive source of information allowing us to make a detailed comparative analysis. In the best 
source of micro data, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), variables of education, industry, and 
occupation are not comparable or are even missing. Thus, we have to compose a depiction from 
various sources, which does not offer a consistent multivariate analysis. 
 
3.1  Overall disparities 
In communist-era Central Europe, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had an exceptionally 
equal earnings distribution. Unlike Poland and Hungary, where liberalizing forces began before 1989, 
little similar happened in the Czechoslovak economy until 1990. Before 1989, the bottom half 
of earnings distribution was similar in all CEE countries in 1988, while the upper half of 
the distribution was less equal in Poland and even more divergent in Hungary than in Czechoslovakia. 
The same contrast can be observed when comparing Czech data with wage statistics of the same 
period from Germany and France, and an even greater contrast appears vis-à-vis Austria and Great 
Britain, where earnings distribution is also less equal in the bottom half (Table 7). 
Without any particular intention to increase inequality, the economic reforms launched in 
1990 started to direct distribution of earnings towards greater disparities. Although this process has 
affected all CEE countries, previous differences between them in income inequality have been largely 
maintained: dispersion in earnings inequality in the early 1990s was again the greatest in Hungary, 
still considerable in Poland, and the least in the former East Germany. The split of Czechoslovakia 
after 1993 has entailed a divergence in the earnings distribution into larger disparities in the rapidly 
(although only formally) privatized and more marketized Czech Republic and narrower disparities 
in the intentionally more statist and welfarist Slovakia. 
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TABLE 7  Earnings distribution in CEE countries and Western Europe between 1988 and 1992  
(percentiles and decile ratios)  
 
 Percentile (percent of median)  
Year and country 
 5th 10th 25th  75th  90th 95th 
Decile 
ratio  
90/10  
1988  
Czech Republica  53.8 60.0 74.4 118.9 143.8 162.5 2.40  
Slovakiaa  53.6 61.7 77.0 123.2 149.3 168.0 2.42  
Hungaryb 50.0 58.3 74.4 135.1 183.3 225.9 3.14  
Polandb  55.4 62.7 78.2 126.3 163.3 191.6 2.60  
East Germanyc   68.1 82.1 121.1 141.9   2.08  
West Germanyc   62.5 78.3 129.7 173.1   2.77  
Austriad  51.0   181.0   3.55  
Great Britainb 47.3 54.7 72.3 137.1 183.9 226.5 3.36  
Franced   65.0   194.0   2.98  
1991/1992  
Czech Republica  51.2 56.1 69.6 116.7 153.5 184.2 2.74  
Slovakia a  68.1    170.5   2.50  
Polandb   61.6 77.3 132.4 179.8 219.3 2.92  
Hungaryb 48.3 56.0 72.6 145.9 203.7 257.1 3.64  
East Germanyc   69.6 82.9 123.8 159.4   2.29  
Austriad  51.0    178.0   3.49  
Great Britainb 47,3 54,8 71,7 138,0 186,5 228,0 3.40  
Franced   65.0    196.0   3.02  
Sources:   a Microcensus 1989 and 1992 
b
 (Atkinson – Micklewright, 1992) 
c
 (Krueger – Pischke, 1992) 
d
 OECD Economic Outlook 1993 
 
Table 8 displays changes in wage disparities along a single indicator of decile ratio. This is 
a simple indicator, the advantage of which is availability and clarity, but whose disadvantage is in 
neglecting the lowest and highest wage deciles of workers. Let us remember again that in the Czech 
Republic, the fastest increase in wages has been in the tenth income decile, which was likely the case 
in other countries as well. For a comparison of over-time changes, we gather various sources which 
are not always completely comparable; we then have to interpret the figures cautiously. As Atkinson 
and Brandolini (2000) remind us, the secondary use of various data sets always involves many 
uncertainties and leads to differing results. 
In our collection, given the great disparity in Hungary it might be suspected that not only full-
time jobs were included in the data (despite the explicit statement of a CSO officer). The jump in 
differences in the Czech Republic in 1993–1995 should also be taken as illusory, because the wage 
statistics of the time were compiled from various sources instead of from a standard survey. If these 
two years are omitted, we see a continual, slowly rising wage disparity. As a result of this increase, 
the Czech Republic locates itself somewhere between the cluster of typically “liberal” and South 
European countries displaying more inequality and the cluster of welfarist West and North European 
countries displaying less inequality. 
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TABLE 8 Disparities in earnings in OECD countries (decile ratio 90/10) 
 
Country  1980 1985 1989 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 
Czech 
Republic  
 2.52 2.45 2.74 (3.19) (3.14) (3.73) 2.82 2.80 
Hungary  2.39 2.64 3.14 3.64 3.59 4.16   4.19 
Poland 2.88 2.70 2.43 2.9 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 
East Germany    2.08 2.29      
West Germany 2.67  2.45 2.44 2.32  2.37   
Austria  2.61  3.55 3.54 3.58 3.66   (2.70) 
Belgium 2.01  2.36 2.29 2.25 2.08    
Denmark 2.14 2.17 2.18 2.17      
France 3.08 3.12 3.28 3.23 3.26 3.28    
Italy 2.64 2.50 2.16  2.77  3.11   
Netherlands  2.89 3.05 3.08  3.04 2.57   
Portugal  3.62 3.49 3.96 4.05  3.96   
Sweden 2.04 2.07 2.12 2.10 2.13     
Switzerland   2.72 2.67 2.71 2.65 2.72 2.75  
Great Britain 2.79 3.06 3.28 3.31 3.33 3.31 3.38   
USA     4.16 4.35 4.39   
Japan 3.01 3.11 3.16 3.03 3.04 3.02    
Sources: Czech Republic: Wage surveys of the CSO (figures in parentheses based on estimates whose reliability is limited.) 
Hungary: (Atkinson – Micklewright, 1992); since 1992 personal communication of Elizabeth Lindner (CSO). 
Poland: (Atkinson – Micklewright, 1992); (Rutkowski, 2000) 
East Germany: (Krueger – Pischke, 1992) 
Other countries: OECD Economic Outlook, 1993, 1996 
Figures of 1995 for West Germany, France, Netherlands and Portugal, see OECD DEELSA/ELSA/WP7(99)4. 
 
Notes: – OECD Economic Survey Czech Republic 1998 reports for Austria 1994 different figure than OECD Economic Outlook 
– 2.95. 
– Austrian Microcensus 1997 returns much lower figures for dependent workers than are reported by OECD. 
 
 
3.2.  Returns to education 
Returns to education also reveal considerable international differences. If observing transitory 
changes, we have to consider the quite opposite forces shaping dynamic markets against static 
command economies. In a market economy, education is primarily a personal investment that is 
validated in economic competition where a higher productivity of labor is expected vis-à-vis 
knowledge capital. In a command economy, education is considered a public good that does not need 
to be individually rewarded. Although the original hard-line-communist ideology (“as you have 
studied with working-class money, thus the surplus of your work should belong to it”) was never 
applied to its full extent, the position of educated workers in communist Europe and especially in the 
former Czechoslovakia was hardly comparable with those in Western countries. 
As Table 9 shows, educational disparities in OECD countries differ greatly, with the extreme 
of welfarist countries (Denmark, Norway) displaying small inequalities and liberal countries (Great 
Britain, USA) displaying larger inequalities. In our opinion, the reliability of such data is a little 
doubtful as at least two countries do not meet expectations: Italy, with extremely small wage 
differences, and France, with disparities that are large (we refer here back to Table 8, which displays 
a quite similar range of disparities in both countries). Following this source, educational disparities 
in the Czech Republic already exceeded the level of the “socially generous” Western countries. Czech 
disparities among all employees were similar to those in Germany, and among men alone they are 
about at the level of Italy, Switzerland or Great Britain. 
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TABLE 9  Disparities in earnings by education in OECD countries, data from 1995 
(in percent of earnings of secondary educated workers) 
 
Lower education Tertiary education The ratio tertiary/lower  
Country Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women
. 
Czech Republic  78 75 69 151 143 138 1.94 1.91 2.00 
Germany 76 82 82 158 152 151 2.08 1.85 1.84 
Denmark 84 86 87 134 138 132 1.59 1.60 1.53 
Finland 93 91 93 187 190 174 2.01 2.09 1.87 
France 82 85 79 178 185 167 2.17 2.18 2.11 
Ireland 85 77 62 183 171 187 2.15 2.22 3.02 
Italy 77 74 74 134 142 120 1.74 1.92 1.62 
Netherlands 86 87 77 137 135 143 1.59 1.55 1.86 
Portugal 64 62 64 184 182 175 2.88 2.94 2.73 
Sweden 90 88 89 153 158 144 1.70 1.80 1.62 
Switzerland 71 80 75 161 146 161 2.27 1.82 2.15 
Great Britain 74 79 69 181 161 190 2.44 2.04 2.75 
USA 67 64 64 183 183 175 2.73 2.86 2.73 
Sources: OECD; Figure of the Czech Republic recalculated according to Microcensus 1996. 
Note: Only persons 25–64 years old are included. 
 
The more widespread higher skills are (which is the case in developed countries), the lower 
their returns in comparison with lower levels of education (Baudelot – Glaude, 1990). This helps to 
explain why education in transitory countries might be even better rewarded than in more advanced 
countries, where education enrollments are higher. To the point, Denis H. Sullivan and Timothy 
M. Smeeding observed that “while there is evidence that sufficiently increased supplies of highly 
educated workers can reduce or reverse growing education premia, the cross-section evidence is not 
consistent with the claim that among advanced (OECD) nations, higher levels of educational 
attainment are associated with lower levels of inequality” (Sullivan – Smeeding, 1997:12). While 
in Sweden, a steady decrease of return to education was documented (Björklund, 2000), 
the US college wage premium experienced a narrowing in the 1970s and increased again in the 1980s, 
due to developments in the private sector (Katz – Krueger, 1991). 
In transition countries, education premia are growing simultaneously with the increasing 
supply of well-educated people. This seems to be a unique case that contradicts the observation 
of countries where capitalist development was never disrupted. The higher return to education 
in reform countries should not be necessarily backed by higher labor productivity. 
As the improvement of the position of educated workers outstrips the restructuring of their jobs and 
firms, we can seek an explanation in a sort of “political rent” associated with the establishing 
of a democratic regime. This regime suppressed the degradation of higher education and spiritual 
work imposed by communism. People with higher education are also abundant among the best-paid 
workers, in reference to whom Kertesi and Köllö (1999, p. 11) speak about a special “privatization 
gain.” 
We present quite opposite trends regarding premiums for higher education in reform and 
advanced countries by overtime changes in four Central European countries (Table 10). Education 
levels substantially rose in all reform countries – most so in the Czech Republic. The opposite is true 
for Austria. Surprisingly enough, current disparities seem to be quite close in all countries under 
observation, which is a result of opposing tendencies: while in reform countries wage premiums 
for educated employees were increasing, in Austria they were decreasing. Even so, the most-recent 
Austrian figures are somewhat lower than in the reform countries. On the other side, however, 
rewards for university education is more distanced from secondary education in Austria than 
in reform countries. 
In fact, the comparison of relative returns to education reveals little about the actual 
functioning of the national economy in general and the labor market in particular. A close relationship 
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between the higher productivity of labor of educated workers and their earnings is an assumption 
of human capital theory. Observing the actual developments in the Czech Republic in the 1990s, 
although returns to education considerably rose, overall productivity of labor actually fell or has 
improved due to reductions in the labor force. In any case, changes in employment were much more 
important for overall labor productivity than rising earnings disparities. Apparently, there are many 
more conditions for long-term economic growth than only the profitability of skills, reaching from 
the macroeconomic background to functioning market institutions and business ethics. 
 
TABLE 10 Wage premiums for individual levels of education and for one year of schooling in three 
transition countries and Austria (percent) 
Country and year Primary Vocational Secondary University One year of school 
Czech Republic      
All          1970 reference  4.9 12.8 32.3   3.0 
  1988 reference  5.4 15.1 38.1   4.4 
             1992 reference 10.2 31.7 57.6   6.9 
 1996 reference 13.8 40.6 73.7   8.8 
1996 reference 11.9 39.8 93.6 11.1 
Men      1970 reference  3.6 14.1 30.1   3.0 
 1988 reference  4.3 12.4 33.9   4.0 
             1992 reference  9.8 26.0 52.5   6.1 
 1996 reference 16.6 39.1 73.1   8.3 
1996 reference 15.8 40.3 94.4 10.9 
Women 1970 reference  7.2 11.3 34.2   2.9 
 1988 reference  5.5 18.2 45.3   5.1 
             1992 reference  9.6 37.0 64.2   8.0 
1996 reference 10.7 42.1 75.7   9.4 
1996 reference  7.8 39.3 96.7 11.4 
Hungary      
Men       1989 reference 11.6 24.8 67.8 - 
  1992 reference 14.5 34.9 83.9 - 
  1996 reference 14.5 32.9 86.8 - 
Women 1989 reference 12.8 26.0 74.1 - 
  1992 reference 14.2 35.7 86.7 - 
  1996 reference 11.6 33.1 88.0 - 
Poland      
All          1987  - - - 5.0 
              1992  - - - 7.9 
   1996  - 34.0 77.4 7.3 
Men       1992 -9.3 reference (-4.1)–8.6 29.7 - 
   1995 -10.3 reference 7.6–13.6 44.1 - 
Women  1992 -8.6 reference 14.2–15.8 30.2 - 
   1995 -3.5 reference 7.4–12.3 43.2 - 
Austria      
Men        1981 reference   9.7 33.0 67.2 10.3 
               1989 reference 10.6 33.1 60.7 9.7 
               1993 reference 10.7 26.0 61.2 9.4 
   1995 reference - - - 6.9 
   1997 reference - - - 7.4 
Women  1981 reference - - - 11.6 
               1989 reference - - - 10.4 
               1993 reference - - - 8.9 
               1995 reference - - - 6.1 
     1997 reference - - - 8.0 
 
Note: In Poland and Austria general secondary education is taken as secondary level.  
 
Sources: – Czech Republic : Microcensus 1970, 1989, 1992 and 1996 (budget and non-budget sectors, controlled 
for gender, experience, experience2; the italicized line for 1996 was controlled for industry and 
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region as well) 
 – Hungary: (Kertesi – Köllö, 1999) (non-budget sector, controlled for gender, experience, experience2, 
occupation, productivity, capital/labor ratio, firm size, industry) 
 – Poland: figures on all employees according to (Rutkowski, 2000) (budget and non-budget sectors, 
controlled for gender, experience, experience2, industry); figures on men and women according 
to Puhani, quoted by (Kertesi – Köllö, 1999) (budget sector, controlled for experience, experience2, 
occupation, residence, industry, household type, local unemployment rate, previous employment 
status and disability); last column according to Rutkowski, 2000 (budget and non-budget sectors, 
controlled for gender, experience, experience2, industry). 
 – Austria: figures for individual education level according to (Hofer – Pichelmann – Schuh, 1999) 
(non-budget sector, controlled for gender, experience, experience2), figures for return of schooling 
according to (Fersterer – Winter-Ebmer, 1999) (budget and non-budget sectors, controlled for 
gender, experience, experience2; italicized figures were controlled for family background, 
nationality, region, city size and industry as well) 
 
 
3.3  Gender disparities 
According to wage surveys, the gender gap was reduced somewhat in the Czech Republic 
after 1989. While in 1988, the average wage of full-time female workers was 71 percent of their male 
counterparts, it rose to 77 percent in 1996 but declined again to 72 percent in 1999, with a tendency 
towards a slight leveling of disparities in 1999, when it reached 73 percent (Wage differentiation, 
2000). However, a more positive trend is registered by using wage median — according to it, 
the relation has increased from 71 in 1988 to 78 in 1997. While men’s low wages stagnated and upper 
wages mounted, the increase in women’s wages was more proportionate (Holy, 1999). In those 
calculations, wages were not adjusted to working hours; even if only full-time jobs are taken into 
account in wage surveys, women still work fewer hours. 
Also, in other reform countries, the wage position of women compared with men somewhat 
improved after 1989, as Elizabeth Brainerd (1997) observed; however, not on fully consistent and 
comparable data. The Czech Republic was somewhat backward in the process. As Rutkowski (2000) 
found, gender variable returned a 24 percent gap in Hungary (1996, data of household panel) and 
31 percent in Poland (1996, LFS data). The 1996 Microcensus data (see Table 2a) returns 37 percent, 
which is by far the highest figure. However, our experience tells us that wages observed by statistical 
surveys cover, in fact, a lesser share of actual earnings (from all jobs and informal economy) 
in Hungary and Poland than in the Czech Republic. Therefore, the real gender gap in those countries 
is likely to be greater than available statistical data show. 
As we reported above, although the variance explained by gender differences decreased 
considerably in the Czech Republic after 1989, wage disparity between men and women still remains 
considerable. However, the gap does not differ from Western European countries substantially. In 
the mid-1990s, women’s gross hourly wages as a percentage of men’s varied between 72–74 percent 
in Southern European countries like Portugal and Spain (but also in Austria and the UK), and 87–
88 percent in Northern European countries like Denmark and Sweden, France, Germany and Italy, 
which are located somewhere in the middle of the range. After allowing for the structural gap, the EU 
average was 15 percent less for women. Even in the age group cohort 25–29, who have had equal 
access to education and jobs, women’s earnings were only 86 percent of men’s (Population, 1999). 
The Czech Republic is thus closer to Southern European countries in gross gender gap, which is 
largely produced by discrimination. 
The weight of “discrimination” in total gender gap is estimated by decomposition methods 
which distinguish between structural differences and the “rest” which can be attributed to a break 
of equal pay. Some results for Western countries are surprisingly favorable in this sense. In Germany, 
Monika Jungbauer-Gans (1999) observed that after controlling for job-access variables, self-employed 
women do not bear any earning difference compared with men, unlike dependent employees. 
In France, Dominique Meurs and Sophie Ponthieux (1999) calculated on the Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) data four interesting figures measuring the ratio of women’s to men’s wage in percent: –23.9 
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for all employees, –12.4 for full-time employees, –11.4 in addition after controlling for differences in 
access to any job, and only –6.9 after controlling moreover for differences in access to full-time 
employment. 
In the Czech Republic, the situation is much less favorable than in Western countries. Stepan 
Jurajda made an original decomposition analysis on 1998 wage surveys from the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia using both worker and company variables. The results show that after including age, 
education, occupation and firm ownership, one-third of the overall pay difference in the public sector 
remains attributable to gender, and almost two-thirds in the private sector. As the author states, this is 
much higher than. in the USA, for example, where the “discrimination” residue amounts to only one-
third of the entire gap, which is, however, much larger (Jurajda, 2000). In this sense, the Czech 
Republic is considerably behind Western countries. 
 
4.  Conclusion and discussion  
Pre-1989 Czechoslovakia was characterized by earnings equality and, within remaining 
disparities, by the predominance of demographic features of individuals (gender and age) over their 
market characteristics (skills and occupation) in the determination of earnings. Alongside this, some 
industries (mining, metallurgy, heavy machinery) were favored, and selected categories of workers 
(top state and party bureaucrats, army and police officers) privileged. Behind the facade of an almost 
stable range and small overall disparities, demographic factors had been gaining further importance 
and so-called productive industries had been promoted, while the wage position of higher educated 
people had declined and younger generations were disadvantaged in favor of older workers. 
The transformation process since 1989 broke those tendencies and has begun to change 
the established earnings structure. The overall range of inequality in wages has increased, as have 
returns to education, while the gender gap has somewhat attenuated and the age profile of earnings 
has became considerably flatter. Cross industry, the former administrative “tariff grid” was replaced 
by market differences in a considerable, though not to a full degree. In the public sector, a new and 
simpler tariff grid has been applied that (again) favors experience above qualification. In most 
of the private sector, wages are negotiated between employers and trade unions. Lawyers, managers 
and experts in marketing and other special services to foreign firms currently enjoy salaries 
comparable with their Western counterparts. 
Despite a step-by-step adjustment of the earnings structure, the current system is still 
a mixture of previous features (as the importance of gender attests), transitory characteristics 
(displayed especially by disparities among ownership sectors), and a targeted system (which is best 
documented by the increasing returns to education). Given various circumstances, the adjustment 
to market standards is uneven. The shift towards the “western model” of rewarding labor has been 
apparently more rapid in new private firms and in foreign-owned companies. Also, public services 
have seen an uneven rise in earnings, some of which are advancing (in finance, public administration, 
justice), while others lag behind (in health and social services, education and research). There is also 
a segment of foreign (most often Ukrainian) workers in the Czech Republic performing low-prestige 
jobs in construction and light manufacturing. 
Within all limitations, observed tendencies and cross-national comparisons demonstrably 
show that, in a relatively short time span, Czech wage inequality and structure have greatly converged 
toward the Western pattern. The decreasing significance of demographic characteristics and 
the increasing importance of education conveys this most clearly. Here again, as is the case in so 
many areas of economic and social life under transformation, important questions appear: how 
substantial are these changes; is the placement of competent people in responsible jobs markedly 
better; what is the impact on labor productivity; how do they contribute to the creation of incentives 
to work well and manage rationally; and, do they improve the efficiency of the economy as a whole? 
Such questions certainly exceed the limits of our contribution and the explanatory power 
of all available survey variables. Nevertheless, without going into a profound discussion, we can 
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assume that, in fact, there is no guarantee that higher disparities ensure higher labor productivity, that 
more education yields higher labor productivity, or that the more room left for the “market” 
characteristics of workers in wage determination will be actually used for the improvement of work 
and management incentives. There are certainly many doubts about all of this, and only one observed 
result can be taken as a certainty: that after decades of stagnation the whole of the Czech earnings and 
incentive structure is in motion and that this motion provides a unique opportunity to develop 
an open-market economy. 
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SOURCES USED AS PRIMARY DATA IN THE STUDY  
 
Microcensus surveys 
Large income surveys, began in 1958, as regular statistical surveys conducted every 3–5 years on 1–2 percent 
samples of households. Data on wages were reported by employers and pension benefits by post offices. Here, 
we used the 1989 Microcensus conducted by the CSO on a 2 percent random sample (N = 69,912) in March 
1989, including yearly incomes in 1988; the 1992 Microcensus, conducted by the CSO on a 0.5 percent random 
sample (N = 16,234) in March 1993, and including yearly incomes in 1992; and the 1996 Microcensus, 
conducted by the CSO on a 1 percent random sample (N = 28,148) in March 1997, and including yearly incomes 
in 1996. In the two later surveys, incomes were not confirmed, but data corrections were made by the CSO. 
In Table 10, we used also the 1970 Microcensus conducted by the CSO on a 2 percent random sample 
of the population included in Census of the Population 1970. Our calculations are made on the sample 
of 14,533 full-time employees. 
ISSP modules on Social Inequalities 
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is a long-term international research project that is based 
on international and inter-project cooperation in the social sciences. Each year, research on one topic is 
conducted in all participating countries. Data files are archived by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische 
Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne. In 1992 and 1999, a module on social inequality was applied 
involving opinions that addressed income distribution and social stratification. Our calculations are made 
on the sample of 977 respondents in the labor force. 
Economic Expectations and Attitudes (EEA) 
The surveys of the Czechoslovak and later only Czech population started in May 1990 and were conducted 
biannually in 1990–1992 and in following years, annually (1993–1998). Surveys were organized by the team 
of socioeconomists of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences headed by Jiri Vecernik. 
The samples include adults selected by a two-step quota-sampling procedure, whereby the region and size of 
the locality were defined in the first step, and gender, age and education in the second. The data was collected by 
the Center for Empirical Research STEM.  
(Second) International Adult Literacy Survey (SIALS) 
A long-term international research project, which originated in 1995, and is backed by Statistics Canada and ETS 
at Princeton University. The survey is focused on a detailed surveying of the so-called functional literacy of adult 
persons based on testing their ability to understand printed information and use in everyday life. The Czech data 
were collected by the SC&C agency from  December 1997 to April 1998 from 3132 respondents (5000 were 
targeted). 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Wage and income surveys from 1989 to 1999 reveal the extent of changes in the inequality of earnings 
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in the Czech Republic and the main components of the new income disparities. The author first examines the 
increasing differences and the decreasing weight of demographic characteristics in wage structure. Then, in the 
second part of the paper, evidence is gathered toward a cross-national comparison of income distribution in order 
to demonstrate the increasing similarity of the Czech wage structure with those in Western countries. The 
introduction of a market economy in the Czech Republic in the Nineties has led to an increase in earnings 
disparity similar to those in the West; the communist-era demographic of earnings is being replaced by capitalist 
market characteristics; and ownership disparities, instead of political privileges, have come to the fore. Thus, the 
overall earnings structure underwent systemic changes and approaches the Western pattern. 
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Monetary Policy in the Czech Republic and EMU 
Accession 
 
Jiří JONÁŠ* 
 
 
 
 In the future, the Czech Republic is expected to become a member of the European Union 
(EU) and subsequently of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Future membership in the EU and 
EMU has important implications for domestic economic policy, including monetary policy. EU 
membership will affect the institutional framework of monetary policy, particularly the institutional 
aspects of central-bank independence, more than it will the conduct of monetary policy.1 Conversely, 
eventual EMU membership will directly affect the conduct of monetary policy, for two reasons. First, 
because of the need to meet the Maastricht qualification criteria for EMU membership; and second, 
because of the introduction of the common European currency and the loss of an exchange rate as 
an instrument of economic policy. 
 The Maastricht criteria specifying maximum acceptable inflation and the behavior of nominal 
exchange rates are of most relevance to the conduct of monetary policy. Inflation in the EMU-
candidate countries must not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points average inflation in the three 
EMU members with the lowest inflation rates. Moreover, for a period of two years before the EMU 
membership, the nominal exchange rate of the EMU candidate is allowed to fluctuate at maximum by 
± 15 percent against the euro. To a large extent (though not exclusively), the monetary policy of the 
Czech National Bank (CNB) will be responsible for meeting these requirements. 
 I will not discuss in this article the desirability of EMU membership for the Czech Republic. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this discussion, I will assume that EMU membership will take place 
as soon as possible, and I will discuss the implications of such an outcome for the conduct of monetary 
policy in the Czech Republic. First, I will discuss two issues related to the rate of inflation: the 
disinflation path specified in the CNB’s long-term monetary strategy, and the quantification of the rate 
of inflation that corresponds to price stability. Second, I will discuss what room exists for price level 
convergence between the Czech Republic and the euro area in the period before and after joining the 
EMU, either by means of a higher rate of inflation or by means of the nominal appreciation of the 
koruna. Finally, I will address the mutual compatibility of the Maastricht criteria under the conditions 
of the rapid growth of labor productivity. 
 
1.  The Speed of Disinflation 
 There is broad agreement that, in the long run, it is economically beneficial to reach and 
maintain price stability (I will discuss below what exactly price stability means). However, there is 
less agreement with respect to the speed with which price stability should be reached. Some 
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 Advisor to the Executive Director, International Monetary Fund (jjonas@imf.org).  
Views in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the official views of the IMF. The author would 
like to thank Martin Čihák and an unknown referee for valuable comments. 
1
 Recent changes in the Central Bank Act have stimulated intensive discussion about the compatibility of 
the amended Act with the EU membership requirements. This issue is not discussed here. In June 2001, 
the Czech Constitutional Court has decided that some of these changes contradict the Constitution. 
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economists and politicians are concerned that too-rapid disinflation, produced by excessively 
restrictive monetary policy, could be very damaging to transition economies. For that reason, they 
recommend a more careful approach to disinflation. This is also the main reason for past criticism of 
the CNB’s disinflation strategy as being too ambitious.2 
 The CNB’s long-term monetary strategy, which outlines the disinflation trajectory, was 
originally formulated in April 1999. Subsequently, it was modified to take into account the actual 
behavior of inflation, and it also reflected changes in the inflation-targeting framework. The first 
column in table 1 shows the original disinflation path from April 1999. This original disinflation 
strategy was based on targeting net inflation. Net inflation was targeted to decline from 3.5–
5.5 percent (a valid medium-term target for 2000, established in 1998) to 1–3 percent in 2005. 
The CNB acknowledges that its 2005 inflation target is somewhat higher than the inflation target of 
the European Central Bank (ECB), but it justifies this on the basis of the distortion of price indices 
resulting from changes in the quality of goods, and also by more frequent and larger changes in 
relative prices. 
 However, after this long-term monetary strategy was publicly announced, actual inflation 
declined much faster (see the first line in the second column of table 1). For this reason, the CNB 
decided to modify the disinflation path. The original net inflation target for 2001 was reduced, from 3–
5 percent to 2–4 percent, while the long-term target for 2005 remained unchanged.3 Moreover, in its 
April 2001 Inflation Report, the CNB expects that at the end of 2001, net inflation will somewhat 
undershoot this target. This means that the originally assumed linear disinflation trajectory for 2000–
2005 is no longer valid, as net inflation has already approached its long-term targeted level. Instead of 
shifting the targeted band down by 0.5 percentage points annually, based on the principle of 
the nonacceleration of inflation, it will now be necessary simply to maintain net inflation roughly at 
the present level in a horizontal band, as the CNB assumes. This reduction in the required speed of 
disinflation was made possible by the CNB’s decision to lock in the effects of the positive disinflation 
shock from previous years, and not to allow a significant acceleration of inflation, even though such an 
acceleration could still have been compatible with the original disinflation path. 
 In April 2001, the CNB introduced some modification of the inflation-targeting framework. 
The main change was the shift from targeting net inflation to targeting headline inflation, measured by 
the consumer price index. At the same time, the CNB announced a long-term headline inflation target 
(see the third column in the table). The 2005 headline inflation of 2–4 percent is intended to be 
compatible with the original net inflation target of 1–3 percent. 
 Is this pace of disinflation adequate or is it too fast, as some critics of the CNB claim? There 
are two possible approaches to the discussion of the speed of disinflation in the Czech Republic under 
current conditions: theoretical and institutional. 
 Let’s first briefly look at the theoretical approach. Theoretically, there exists an optimal speed 
of disinflation that minimizes the sacrifice ratio of disinflation. The sacrifice ratio is defined as the 
costs in terms of loss of output and employment of reducing inflation by a certain amount. In practice, 
it is always difficult to exactly specify the optimal speed of disinflation. The knowledge that 
disinflation, which is either too fast or too slow, would result in too high a sacrifice ratio is not likely 
to be very useful for practical monetary-policy decisions. 
                                                 
2
 The CNB has been criticized quite often for the speed of disinflation, particularly during the period 1998–99. 
However, I am not aware of any specific proposals as to what an alternative strategy of disinflation should look 
like. 
3
 It should be also noted that at the end of 2000 and early in 2001, the CNB has twice reduced its projected net 
inflation for the end of 2001, first from 2.2–3.9 percent to 2.0–3.7 percent, and subsequently to 1.7–3.4 percent. 
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TABLE 1  CNB Disinflation Strategy 
Actual inflation and short-term target  Long-term 
monetary 
strategy 
1999 a 
Net inflation Headline inflation 
Inflation target for 
2002-2005, headline 
inflation c 
2000 3.5–5.5 3.0 4.0 - 
2001 3.0–5.0 2.0–4.0 (1.9–3.2) b 4.3–5.8 (3.3–4.4) b - 
2002 2.5–4-5 - - 3.0–5.0 
2003 2.0–4.0 - - - 
2004 1.5–3.5 - - - 
2005 1.0–3.0 - - 2.0–4.0 
 
Notes: a The document does not specify explicitly net inflation for 2001–2004, it only notes that in case of linear disinflation, net 
inflation would decline by about 0.5 percentage points annually. 
b
 Net inflation target and headline inflation forecast from April 2000 (in parenthesis, April 2001 forecast). 
c
 Modification of the inflation-targeting framework announced by the CNB in April 2001. 
The interval 3–5 percent corresponds to expected inflation for January 2002. The CNB considers the headline 
inflation target of 2–4 percent for December 2005 compatible with the original net inflation target of 1–3 percent. 
Source: CNB 
 
 
 Is this pace of disinflation adequate or is it too fast, as some critics of the CNB claim? There 
are two possible approaches to the discussion of the speed of disinflation in the Czech Republic under 
current conditions: theoretical and institutional. 
 Let’s first briefly look at the theoretical approach. Theoretically, there exists an optimal speed 
of disinflation that minimizes the sacrifice ratio of disinflation. The sacrifice ratio is defined as 
the costs in terms of loss of output and employment of reducing inflation by a certain amount. In 
practice, it is always difficult to exactly specify the optimal speed of disinflation. The knowledge that 
disinflation, which is either too fast or too slow, would result in too high a sacrifice ratio is not likely 
to be very useful for practical monetary-policy decisions. 
 While it is difficult to pin down the optimal speed of disinflation, we are, however, able to 
identify factors that affect the sacrifice ratio of disinflation. One of the most important determinants of 
the sacrifice ratio is the extent to which nominal contracts in the economy, and actual inflation, depend 
on past inflation, that is, on the degree of indexation in the economy. Usually, in an economy with 
a long history of high inflation, nominal contracts reflect past inflation (for example, wage growth in 
period t is derived from inflation in period t–1). In that situation, it is usually quite difficult to reduce 
inflation without a strong shock to the structure of such contracts, such as could result from a change 
in the monetary-policy framework. The structure of nominal contracts also bears on the ability of 
a central bank and government to affect inflation expectations, and thus weaken the dependence of 
the future inflation on present and past inflation. The less widespread the indexation, and the higher 
the ability of a central bank and government to affect inflation expectations, the faster can disinflation 
proceed, for a given cost of disinflation. 
 Somewhat less clear is the role of the length of nominal contracts in the economy in affecting 
the sacrifice ratio. For example, Fuhrer (1994) argues that if nominal contracts in the economy have 
longer duration, in the short-run they are less responsive to the unexpected acceleration of disinflation 
and, as a result, disinflation may be more costly. One reason is the excessive increase in real wages as 
a result of lesser erosion of the given nominal-wage increase when inflation turns out to be less than 
expected in setting nominal wages. Another reason could be the unexpected increase in real interest 
rates and debt service cost. However, it is likely that in an economy with a history of price instability 
that deals with the problem of disinflation, long-term nominal contracts will not be very widespread. 
Also, when inflation reaches low levels and incentives for long-term contracts increase, there will be 
less room for potentially costly “inflation surprises” on account of faster disinflation. 
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 In the literature, it is quite difficult to find clear support for slow or fast disinflation per se.4 If 
there is a consensus at all, it is that an optimum speed of disinflation will be different for different 
economies, depending on their specific characteristics as discussed above, and also depending on 
the initial level of inflation. If we assume that higher inflation is usually more costly for an economy, 
in this case, faster disinflation could be more beneficial. 
 In the period 1998–99, inflation in the Czech Republic declined unexpectedly and 
significantly.5 What were the implications of this unexpected decline in inflation for nominal 
contracts? To begin with, faster-than-expected disinflation resulted in an unexpected increase in real 
wages, as nominal-wage contract agreements were reached based on much higher expected inflation. 
Higher real wage growth is not particularly desirable when the economy suffers from weak economic 
activity, and the result was a notable increase in the unemployment rate, from an average 5.2 percent 
in 1997 to 9.4 percent in 1999. However, one should keep in mind that faster-than-expected 
disinflation during that period resulted mainly from a positive price shock in the form of the decline in 
prices of foodstuffs, oil and some other items, combined with an appreciation of the currency. It could 
be argued that this positive shock reduced the cost of disinflation, in the following sense: 
a significantly more restrictive macroeconomic policy would be needed to ensure the same speed of 
disinflation in the absence of the positive price shock, and this restrictive policy stance would produce 
a much sharper decline in production and increase in unemployment. 
 When discussing the optimal speed of disinflation in the Czech Republic, potentially more 
relevant for monetary policy are the institutional aspects, specifically, the prospect of future EMU 
membership. The Czech Republic can become an EMU member at the earliest two years after joining 
the EU. Before joining the EMU, a candidate country must first participate for at least two years in 
the special exchange-rate regime, the ERM II. Participation in the ERM II is possible only after 
joining the EU. Let’s assume for the purpose of our discussion that the Czech Republic will join 
the EU in 2005, and that it will join the EMU at the beginning of 2008. According to the Maastricht 
criteria, inflation in 2007 should not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points the average inflation 
in the three EMU members with the lowest rates of inflation. Obviously, inflation in the EMU-
member countries will depend, among other things, on the phase of the business cycle and on 
the effects of eventual price shocks. If we assume that the average inflation rate in the three EMU 
countries with the lowest inflation will be 1.5 percent, inflation in the Czech Republic should not 
exceed 3 percent.6 The CNB 2005 headline inflation target is 2–4 percent, and net inflation target 1–
3 percent. If the CNB reaches these long-term targets, and if it subsequently keeps headline inflation in 
the 2–4 percent range, the Czech Republic should not have serious problems with meeting the EMU 
qualification requirement concerning inflation. At most, some small additional disinflation could be 
needed if headline inflation remains in the upper part of the band (and if our assumption about euro-
area inflation is correct). 
 Partly as a result of the positive price shocks that allowed a significant unexpected decline in 
inflation during 1998–99, meeting the 2005 inflation target is realistic. Both net and headline inflation 
have declined to levels approaching price stability in the aftermath of these shocks. That, however, 
does not guarantee an easy path to meeting the 2005 target. Several risks exist which could make it 
difficult to meet this objective. 
                                                 
4
 One exception is Ball (1994), who argues that faster disinflation per se is preferable because it is more credible 
than slow disinflation. 
5
 In its July 1998 report, which for the first time contained an inflation forecast, the CNB expected that at the end 
of 1998 net inflation would reach the lower part of the 5.5–6.5 percent interval. However, net inflation actually 
fell to 1.7 percent. Regarding the consumer price index, the CNB expected in the same report that, by the end of 
1998, CPI would return to the level that prevailed at the end of 1997, i.e., to around 10 percent. In reality, at the 
end of 1998 the CPI reached 6.8 percent. Similar inflation target and forecast undershooting took place in 1999. 
6
 In 2000, euro-area inflation was somewhat higher, 2.3 percent, as a result of higher oil prices. The market 
consensus forecast, quoted in the June 23–29 issue of the Economist, shows the euro-area inflation rate is 
projected to remain at 2.3 percent in 2001 as well, but it should decline to 1.7 percent in 2002. 
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 One potential risk rests with fiscal policy. Unless radical reform of public budgets takes place 
soon, the general government budget deficit will further increase. That includes, most importantly, 
a restraint on the rapid growth of mandatory spending. As a consequence, fiscal policy would become 
procyclical. In other words, it would provide additional stimulus to domestic demand growth at a time 
when economic recovery is well advanced. A procyclical fiscal policy would make it more difficult to 
reduce inflation further. The second potential risk is wage development. If the CNB’s long-term 
disinflation strategy is to serve as a basis for wage negotiations, and if aggregate real wage growth 
does not exceed the growth of labor productivity, wages should not become a source of inflationary 
pressures, and they should not complicate the attainment of the 2005 inflation target. In this respect, 
an important role will be played by the credibility of the CNB’s disinflation strategy, and by 
the willingness of trade unions to accept the CNB’s inflation targets and projections as a basis for 
negotiating nominal-wage contracts. The third potential risk to disinflation is the need to complete 
price deregulation. Under conditions of rapid economic growth and the full use of productive 
resources, there is a risk that price deregulation could result in secondary price effects. Finally, it is not 
possible to exclude the prospect of an adverse price shock, such as might result from repeated oil-price 
increases.7 Given the openness of the Czech economy, exchange-rate development will be also 
important. For example, a sudden slowdown in the inflow of foreign direct investment, which 
presently finances the current-account deficit of the balance of payments, the koruna could weaken 
significantly, with adverse inflationary effects. 
 
2.  Quantification of price stability 
 As has already been noted, there is general agreement that price stability has a beneficial 
effect on economic activity, and is thus a desirable economic-policy objective. Above, we have 
discussed the issue of how fast to reach price stability. There is, however, another practical issue: what 
exactly does price stability mean? There is extensive literature discussing how to quantify price 
stability.8 
 In the literature, we can find several reasons why central banks should not quantify price 
stability as inflation at zero or near zero (in the range of 0–1 percent). The first reason relates to 
downward nominal-wage rigidity. A condition of downward wage rigidity, and inflation near zero, 
would make it very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve real wage adjustment in response to changed 
market conditions, such as a negative demand shock. The result could be higher real wages than are 
desirable, higher unemployment and lower economic growth. The second reason relates to 
the impossibility of reducing nominal interest rates below zero. If the rate of inflation is close to zero, 
it means that real interest rates cannot be pushed below zero. However, for an economy in recession, it 
could be desirable to reduce real interest rates temporarily to a below-zero level in order to stimulate 
economic activity.9 
                                                 
7
 In 2000, the Czech economy was hit by such an adverse price shock, in the form of higher oil prices, but 
inflation did not increase much. However, to a large extent, this could be explained by the still relatively weak 
economic activity at that time, which reduced the intensity of the transition of this primary shock into 
the economy. As domestic demand and growth accelerate, the intensity of the transition of primary shocks into 
the economy could change. 
8
 See, for example, Ackerlof et al. (1996), International Monetary Fund (1996) and the references therein. 
9
 This argument has been made by Summers (1991). 
The English version of the paper originally published in the journal Finance a úvěr  (www.financeauver.org), vol. 51, 2001, no. 9, pp. 472–487 
 
Finance a úvěr, 51, 2001, No. 9  6 
TABLE 2  Targeted inflation 
Country Targeted inflation in % Period 
Czech Republic 1.0–3.0 2005 
Australia 2.0–3.0 Average during a business cycle 
Brazil 2.0–6.0 2001 
Chile 2.0–4.0 2001 
Poland < 4.0 2003 
Israel 3.0–4.0 2001 
Mexico 3.0 2003 
United Kingdom 2.5 From 1996 
New Zealand 0–3.0 From 1996 
Canada 1.0–3.0 From 1995 
Euro area < 2.0 From 1999 
 
Source: Schaechter aj. (2000), Web sites of Banco de México, http://www.banxico.org.mx/, and the European Central Bank, 
http://www.ecb.int/. 
 
 In the theoretical literature, one can observe a convergence of views that an inflation rate of 1–
3 percent corresponds to price stability. If we look at how central banks quantify price stability in 
practice (table 2), we see that there is not much difference between this theoretical recommendation 
and what the central banks actually do. This is the case for all economies — developed, developing 
and transitional. 
 Evidently, it is not possible to say with certainty at this time whether the CNB intention to 
reach headline (net) inflation in 2005 in the range of 2–4 (1–3) percent is too ambitious, whether this 
is too low a level of inflation, and whether reaching such low inflation would require maintaining an 
excessively restrictive monetary policy. However, data in table 2 show that the CNB inflation target is 
not too different from inflation targets in other economies. A question arises, though, whether 
the specific conditions of transition economies would not justify targeting somewhat higher inflation 
than in developed economies. Škreb (1998) notes that in the transition economies, it is particularly 
difficult to measure precisely the improvements in the quality of goods. As a result, actual inflation 
could be much lower than measured inflation. Taking into account this imprecision, as well as other 
reasons, Škreb argues that in transition economies, inflation in the range of 4–5 percent would 
correspond to price stability. 
 Other authors argue, however, that during the convergence with the developed economies, 
transition economies should be expected to experience a rapid growth of labor productivity, which 
should produce lower inflation. Deppler (1998) argues that a large positive supply shock resulting 
from the implementation of economic reforms should allow a significant painful reduction in inflation. 
Clinton (2000) argues that rapid productivity growth in transition economies weakens the traditional 
arguments in favor of a notably higher-than-zero inflation rate. Given the rapid growth of labor 
productivity, a decline in nominal wages would rarely be needed. Similarly, given the high real return 
on capital and high-trend economic growth, it is not very likely that a situation would arise in which 
a central bank would have to stimulate an economy in recession with the help of negative real interest 
rates. 
 
3.  Convergence of rate of inflation and price levels 
 Let’s now have a closer look at a frequently discussed issue, the relationship between the rate 
of inflation and convergence of price levels. One argument used against the rapid reduction of 
inflation to a level comparable with developed European economies is based on the perception that 
the convergence of price levels in the Czech Republic and the euro area requires higher inflation in 
the Czech Republic to persist for some time. Another related argument for a slower pace of 
disinflation concerns the need to complete the adjustment of relative prices. The correction of relative 
price deformations from the period of central planning remains under way in transition economies. To 
the extent that there exists a downward nominal-wage rigidity, it is feasible to achieve this correction 
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more through a different speed of increase in individual prices, rather than through an increase of 
some and a decline of other prices. The result is that relative price adjustment produces higher 
inflation.10 
 As is documented in the literature, at the end of the 1990s the adjustment of relative prices in 
the Czech Republic to the structure of relative prices typical to the euro area was far from over. 
Therefore, it could be expected that the combination of nominal rigidities and continued relative price 
adjustment could produce higher inflation.11 
According to different estimates, the price level in the Czech Republic (PCR) is about 
40 percent of the price level in the EU (PE). Generally, we can express the relationship between 
the price levels in the Czech Republic and the euro area as follows: 
PE > PCR . 1/En 
where En is the nominal exchange rate of the koruna, expressed as a number of koruna per euro. 
A convergence of price levels could proceed in one of the following ways. First, the rate of inflation in 
the Czech Republic must be higher than rate of inflation in the euro area (assuming stable nominal 
exchange rate). Second, the nominal exchange rate of the koruna, En, must appreciate faster than 
the difference between the growth of price levels in the euro area and in the Czech Republic. Third, 
a combination of the growth of price levels in the Czech Republic and the nominal appreciation of 
the koruna vis-à-vis the euro must occur such that the result would be a faster growth of price levels in 
the Czech Republic relative to the euro area, expressed in euros. 
 For the purpose of the discussion of price level convergence before the EMU accession, it is 
useful to specify three periods. Each period is characterized by different constraints on inflation rate 
and changes in nominal exchange rate. 
 Period I — before EU accession and before adopting the ERM II regime. In this period, there 
is theoretically no limit for movements of the nominal exchange rate of the koruna. As for the rate of 
inflation, let’s assume that the constraint is the long-term inflation objective for 2005 and 
the corresponding disinflation trajectory. However, actual convergence of price levels on account of 
higher inflation may occur faster than would be permitted by the inflation target. During this period, 
price deregulation and tax changes will be completed, and, as a result, actual inflation may exceed 
targeted inflation. Under such circumstances, the CNB is ready to use the escape clause provision that 
permits it to exceed the inflation target. 
Period II — EU membership and ERM II membership. During this period, nominal exchange-
rate fluctuations will be limited by the ± 15-percent fluctuation band. The increase in prices will 
depend on the CNB inflation target after 2005. In the year preceding entry into the EMU, the inflation 
rate will be constrained by the need to meet the Maastricht criteria. 
 Period III — EMU membership. Introduction of the common currency would mean the end of 
the Czech currency, and changes in the exchange rate will no longer apply. However, there will be no 
constraint on the inflation rate in the form of the Maastricht criteria. 
 Let’s now discuss in more detail how quickly price levels in the Czech Republic and in 
the euro area could converge, given the existing institutional constraints for the rate of inflation and 
the fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
 In the first period, there is no external institutional constraint for price level convergence 
resulting from relatively higher inflation in the Czech Republic. There is only internal institutional 
constraint in the form of the CNB’s inflation targets. For illustrative purposes, let’s assume that 
headline inflation in the Czech Republic will be in line with the CNB’s long-term target. Specifically, 
                                                 
10
 It should be noted that the same speed of such adjustment of relative prices could proceed at different levels of 
inflation. 
11
 See (Čihák – Holub, 2000). 
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let’s assume that inflation will decline linearly from 3–5 percent in January 2002 to 2–4 percent in 
December 2005.12 Furthermore, we assume that euro-area price levels will increase by 2 percent every 
year (the inflation rate measured as by the consumer price index). Under these assumptions, in the 
period 2001–2005 price levels in the Czech Republic will come nearer to euro-area price levels by 
2.7 to 9.4 percentage points.13 
 Presently, it is not fully clear to what extent price level convergence will be affected by price 
deregulation. In the three years following the introduction of inflation targeting, increases in regulated 
prices have contributed more than 50 percent to the increase in consumer prices. Moreover, the price 
level differences in the Czech Republic and the euro area are largest for exactly those items in the 
consumer basket with regulated prices.14 Therefore, to an important extent, the speed of price level 
convergence will depend on the speed of price deregulation in the coming years, or on the size of 
the increase in regulated prices. True, it follows from the CNB’s document specifying the 2005 
inflation target that the targeted level of headline inflation already takes into account the effect of 
expected changes in regulated prices and other administrative measures. However, should changes in 
regulated prices result in higher headline inflation than the CNB’s inflation target, price levels in 
the Czech Republic and in the euro area would converge more than shown in the calculation above. 
 Regarding the possibility of price level convergence in the first period resulting from 
a nominal appreciation of the koruna, the current floating-exchange-rate regime does not create any 
constraint. However, in considering the scope for price level convergence on account of nominal 
exchange-rate appreciation, it is necessary to keep in mind two points. 
 First, the nominal exchange rate is an across-the-board instrument for price level convergence. 
Nominal exchange-rate appreciation results in an increase in the Czech Republic’s price levels, 
measured in foreign currency, but it does not change relative prices. As we have already noted, price 
level differences between individual items differ quite substantially from differences in average price 
levels. To illustrate, in the commodity group “household appliances,” price levels in the Czech 
Republic in 1998 had reached 62 percent of price levels in Germany. However, “healthcare” prices 
were only 13 percent of those in Germany. Nominal exchange-rate appreciation could assist in price 
level convergence for items where price differences are relatively small, but cannot ensure a price 
level convergence for those items where price differences are above average, without at the same time 
creating  “an overshooting” of convergence in other items with smaller price level differences. In other 
words, nominal exchange-rate appreciation cannot be the only or the prevailing mechanism to achieve 
price level convergence, and relative price changes in the form of different speeds of price increase 
will play an important part in price level convergence as well. Also, this means that one cannot fully 
deny the possible inflationary effect of price level convergence by arguing that this convergence could 
be accomplished by nominal exchange-rate appreciation (Clinton, 2000). 
Second, the speed and extent of price level convergence resulting from nominal exchange-rate 
appreciation is limited by its effect on the balance of payments. For this reason, it is unlikely that price 
level convergence in excess of that contributed to real appreciation (caused by the above-discussed 
inflation differential), plus the eventual effect of a higher increase in regulated prices would produce a 
more significant convergence of price levels in the Czech Republic and the euro area. To see why this 
is the case, we note that nominal exchange-rate appreciation, ∆En equals the difference between real 
exchange-rate appreciation, ∆Er and the excess of inflation rate in the Czech Republic relative to the 
euro area, (piCR – piE ): 
∆En = ∆Er – (piCR – piE) 
                                                 
12
 For simplicity, we assume that inflation of 3–5 percent applies to year-end 2001, and that it declines by 
¼ percentage point every subsequent year. 
13
 During this period, the price level in the Czech Republic would increase by 13.1–19.8 percent, while the euro-
area price level would increase by 10.4 percent. 
14
 See Čihák – Holub (2000), table 1. 
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If exchange-rate movements should not neutralize the price level convergence produced by 
the relatively higher inflation rate in the Czech Republic, higher inflation in the Czech Republic must 
not produce a nominal exchange-rate depreciation (negative ∆En). In other words, a real exchange-rate 
appreciation must take place. The question is, to what extent is the real exchange-rate appreciation 
sustainable? 
 Two factors determine the scope for real exchange-rate appreciation. First, initially, the actual 
real exchange-rate could be lower than the equilibrium real exchange rate, and real exchange-rate 
appreciation could take place as a result of closing this gap. There are several reasons identified in 
the literature why presently the real exchange rate of the koruna could be undervalued. Most 
importantly, this reflects the fact that the GDP level in the Czech Republic relative to other countries is 
much higher than the relative price level, which could reflect the slower increase in regulated prices on 
nontradables.15 Second, the actual real exchange rate could appreciate because of the appreciation 
of the real equilibrium exchange rate. There are several reasons why the real equilibrium exchange 
rate in transition economies should appreciate. There is the traditional Balassa-Samuelson effect 
related to differences in labor productivity growth. Also, this appreciation could reflect the gradual 
improvement in the quality of exported goods (or, the willingness of the importers to pay higher prices 
as a result of the recognition of the good quality), and capital inflow related to the higher marginal 
productivity of capital in transition economies with a lower stock of capital.16 However, in the long 
run, real exchange-rate appreciation will be mainly determined by differences in the growth of labor 
productivity. 
 According to the above-described assumptions concerning inflation in the Czech Republic and 
the euro area, during the period 2001–2005, a stable nominal exchange rate of the koruna/euro would 
imply a real appreciation of the koruna against the euro by 2.7–9.4 percent, plus any additional effect 
of the increase in regulated prices on headline inflation that would result in actual inflation in excess 
of the upper limit of the inflation target range. It is uncertain how much inflation could exceed 
the upper limit of the target range on account of the unexpected impact of an increase in regulated 
prices. It is, however, unlikely that during 2001–2005, the real exchange rate of the koruna against 
the euro on account of higher inflation would significantly exceed 10 percent. Would it be possible to 
achieve further price level convergence in excess of the convergence implied by higher inflation in 
the Czech Republic? This would depend on the scope for additional real appreciation of the koruna 
against the euro compatible with sustainable balance of payments development. An important 
determinant of such sustainable real appreciation will be the increase in investment and accompanying 
growth in labor productivity. 
 In the second period, i.e., the period of ERM II membership, two constraints will determine 
how much the rate of inflation in the Czech Republic will exceed inflation in the euro area. First, 
the inflation target specified by the CNB, and second, the specific value of inflation prescribed by 
the Maastricht criteria for EMU membership concerning inflation. Regarding the former, if the CNB 
continues to pursue the principle of nonacceleration of inflation after 2005, then whatever inflation 
target it chooses, the effect on price level convergence would be negligible. During this period, 
inflation in the Czech Republic cannot much exceed inflation in the euro area. At the beginning of 
the second period, during the entry into the ERM II, headline inflation is supposed to be in the 2–
4 percent range. At the end of the second period, the Czech Republic will have to meet the Maastricht 
criteria, which in all likelihood means that inflation will have to be somewhere in the range of 2–
3 percent.17  
                                                 
15
 For a more detailed discussion see (Čihák – Holub, 2000), and (Krajnyák – Zettelmeyer, 1998) 
16
 For discussion of the scope for real exchange rate appreciation in transition economies see (Halpern – 
Wyplosz, 1997). 
17
 However, views have been expressed that there is an inherent tendency of transition economies to display 
higher growth of labor productivity and thus higher inflation. As a result, the Maastricht criteria should take this 
into account and be interpreted flexibly (Szapary, 2000). However, strictly speaking, this observation is correct 
(continued) 
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 How tight a constraint for increases in price levels will the Maastricht criteria of maximum 
permissible inflation represent? If we assume that the rate of inflation in the three EMU countries with 
the lowest inflation will reach 1.5 percent, then the maximum permissible rate of inflation for 
the Czech Republic will be 3 percent. However, the effect on the speed of convergence with euro-area 
price levels depends on total euro-area inflation. Generally, the closer the average rate of inflation in 
the three EMU countries with the lowest inflation is to the euro-area rate of inflation, the faster will be 
the convergence, and vice versa. A situation can even arise that inflation in the three best euro-area 
performers will be so much lower than in the rest of the euro area that the permissible rate of inflation 
in the Czech Republic would still be too low to ensure convergence in price level with the euro area. 
In practice, this is unlikely to happen, and the effect of a skewing of inflation-rate distribution on 
the speed of price level convergence would be small. More importantly, the Maastricht criteria will be 
in force for only one year preceding EMU membership. ERM II membership will last at least two 
years, and thus for at least one year, the CNB’s inflation target will be the only constraint on price 
level increases. Assuming that inflation in the Czech Republic stays at 3 percent in that period, and 
given the assumption about euro-area inflation, price levels in the Czech Republic would converge 
with the euro-area price level by 1.2 percentage points. 
 Given the limited scope in the second period for price level convergence resulting from higher 
inflation in the Czech Republic relative to the euro area, a more important role in this convergence 
would belong to nominal exchange-rate appreciation. In the ERM II fluctuation band, there is room for 
a 15 percent nominal appreciation from parity, which exceeds by a significant amount the possible size 
of price level convergence resulting from different speeds of inflation. Moreover, before joining 
the ERM II, it is possible to introduce a one-time revaluation of the exchange rate. Such a step does 
not make sense, however, in countries like the Czech Republic which have floating exchange rates. 
 During the third period, when the Czech Republic becomes a member of the EMU, 
the situation will be completely reversed compared to the second period. Because the Czech Republic 
will no longer have its own currency, there will be no exchange rate, and therefore no possibility of 
price level convergence on account of nominal exchange-rate appreciation. Any further convergence 
of price levels will have to happen in the form of relatively faster inflation in the Czech Republic. 
Once an EMU member, the Czech Republic would not be subject to any formal inflation constraint. 
The CNB will be a member of the European system of central banks, and it would participate in 
the pursuit of the inflation target set for the whole euro area. Domestic inflation will lose its crucial 
importance to monetary policy. Ireland, where the growth of consumer prices has recently reached 
6 percent, illustrates that euro-area members with lower price levels and faster growth can indeed 
record higher inflation. Particularly in smaller euro-area members, which do not affect much euro-
area-wide inflation, a rapid growth of domestic prices does not represent a serious problem for euro-
area monetary policy.18 
                                                                                                                                                        
only for countries with a fixed exchange rate, where relatively higher growth in labor productivity could not 
result in nominal exchange-rate appreciation. 
18
 Gross domestic product of the six EU-accession countries represent about 5 percent of EU GDP (and slightly 
more of euro-area GDP). 
The English version of the paper originally published in the journal Finance a úvěr  (www.financeauver.org), vol. 51, 2001, no. 9, pp. 472–487 
 
Finance a úvěr, 51, 2001, No. 9  11 
 
4.  Compatibility of low inflation, growth in labor productivity and fixed exchange rate 
 Before concluding, let’s return to one issue that has recently become the subject of an intense 
debate, which we have already briefly noted above. The issue is one of the mutual compatibility of 
the Maastricht criteria concerning inflation and exchange-rate stability in a situation of the real 
convergence of transition economies with the euro-area economies. A possibility has been raised in 
the literature that for transition economies with a fixed exchange rate and rapid growth in labor 
productivity, it could be difficult to ensure the compatibility of price and exchange-rate stability 
assumed by the ERM II mechanism before EMU membership (Masson, 1999). This consideration is 
based on the empirical observation that inflation is relatively higher in countries that have relatively 
higher growth in labor productivity (the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect). 
 If relatively higher growth of labor productivity is not to result in relatively faster growth in 
price levels, the size of nominal exchange-rate appreciation must be as follows: 
∆En = αpiNT . (PPt – PPnt) 
where αpiNT is the share of nontradables in the consumer price index, and the expression in parenthesis 
shows the difference in the growth of labor productivity between sectors of tradable goods and 
nontradeables. For the Czech Republic, the Balassa-Samuelson effect should not represent a serious 
problem during ERM II membership, because the fluctuation band is wide enough to accommodate 
the effect of faster growth in labor productivity in the sector of tradable goods on the rate of inflation. 
To illustrate, let’s assume that the share of nontradables in the consumer price index is one-third, 19 
and that, at the beginning, the koruna exchange rate will be in the center of the fluctuation band. 
The scope for 15 percent nominal appreciation against the euro implies that the excess of growth in 
labor productivity in the sector of tradable goods relative to nontradeables could reach 50 percent, and 
could be accommodated by a nominal appreciation without adversely affecting the rate of inflation. 
 However, the Balassa-Samuelson effect could cause problems for EMU-candidate countries 
that presently maintain a fixed exchange rate in the form of a currency board, and that would like to 
keep this exchange-rate arrangement all the way up to EMU membership. These countries include 
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania. This means that during the ERM II membership, these countries 
would maintain a zero fluctuation band, which could conflict with the requirement to keep inflation 
low in line with the Maastricht criteria. Moreover, it is not clear whether the ECB would allow 
a country to maintain its currency board during the ERM II membership, and whether this would allow 
a country to meet the requirement of exchange-rate stability. According to some ECB representatives, 
a currency board does not allow a country to fully test its ability to maintain currency stability (in 
the limits set by the ERM II band) under the conditions of the free movement of capital. 
 During the ERM II stage, the Balassa-Samuelson effect could be easily accommodated in 
countries with floating exchange rates, like the Czech Republic. However, simultaneously maintaining 
price and exchange-rate stability could be complicated for a different reason. One cannot exclude 
the possibility that the prospect of approaching EMU membership would attract an accelerating inflow 
of foreign capital, which could produce appreciation pressures that could turn out to be stronger than 
otherwise accommodated by the 15-percent fluctuation band. In such circumstances, the CNB could 
be forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market, in order to keep the koruna in the required 
fluctuation band. Unless the CNB succeeds in fully sterilizing the monetary effect of these 
interventions, capital inflow could produce a faster growth in monetary aggregates, which could lead 
to higher inflation and potential problems in meeting the Maastricht criteria. To the extent that 
the accelerated inflow results from the approaching EMU membership, and not from structural 
distortions or inappropriate macroeconomic policy, it should be a temporary problem that in itself 
                                                 
19
 The CNB Inflation Report from October 2000 notes that the share of nontradeables in the consumer price 
index is 32.7 percent. 
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should not represent an insurmountable obstacle to EMU membership. For example, one solution 
could be an upward shift of the exchange-rate band. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 In this article, we have discussed some monetary-policy issues that arise in connection with 
the expected membership of the Czech Republic in the EMU: the speed of disinflation, 
the quantification of price stability, and the possibility of keeping inflation low under conditions of 
real convergence and the convergence of price levels in the Czech Republic and the euro area. 
 The CNB has approved a long-term headline inflation target for 2005 in the 2–4 percent range, 
which should be compatible with the original net inflation target of 1–3 percent. Is the speed of 
disinflation implied by this long-term target too ambitious? First, we have discussed the theoretical 
approach to determining the optimal pace of disinflation, based on the minimization of the sacrifice 
ratio. For practical monetary-policy conduct, this theoretical concept is of only limited use, but at least 
it identifies the determinants of the costs of disinflation. The planned future membership of the Czech 
Republic in the EMU is more important toward determining the speed of disinflation, because this 
membership is conditional on meeting certain qualification criteria, including the criteria of maximum 
permissible inflation. The speed of disinflation implied by the CNB’s long-term inflation target for 
2005 seems to be compatible with the subsequent observation of the EMU’s inflation qualification 
criteria. 
 When we evaluate the cost of disinflation, it is necessary to keep in mind the eventual costs 
that the Czech Republic would incur as a result of delay in EMU membership. If the Czech Republic 
did not succeed in reducing inflation to a level prescribed by the Maastricht criteria, it would have to 
postpone its entry into the EMU. Such a delay could have important costs for the Czech Republic. One 
major source of such costs would be the fact that it is extremely difficult for a small, open economy in 
an environment of the free movement of capital to pursue, in the long run, an independent monetary 
policy without being, from time to time, exposed to financial and economic instability that could result 
exclusively from external shocks.20 
 Furthermore, the article discusses the issue of whether the CNB’s long-term inflation target is 
too low for a transition economy, and whether its attainment would require an excessively restrictive 
monetary policy. While it is not possible at this time to definitively answer this, quantified estimates 
of price stability and the inflation targets of other inflation-targeting central banks do not suggest that 
the CNB’s inflation target is unduly low. However, it must be noted that different views exist. 
 This article comes to the conclusion that the CNB’s long-term inflation target, and 
institutional constraints to price level and nominal exchange-rate movements in the period before 
EMU accession should not seriously limit the possibility of price level convergence between 
the Czech Republic and the euro area. We have tried to indicate the extent and the form of price level 
convergence during the different stages of EMU accession. In the case of the Czech Republic, 
the flexible-exchange-rate regime mitigates the potential conflict between the needed relative price 
adjustment and the requirement to keep inflation sufficiently low to meet the Maastricht criteria. Both 
during the EU pre-accession period (that is, before the introduction of the ERM II mechanism), and 
during the ERM II membership, nominal exchange-rate flexibility will be sufficiently large to absorb 
any of the inflationary effects of the relatively high growth of labor productivity (the so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect). However, the across-the-board change in price levels as a result 
of nominal exchange-rate change does not allow relative price adjustment. Under conditions of 
downward nominal-price rigidity, relative price changes result in higher inflation. Before EMU 
                                                 
20
 However, there are also different opinions, namely that after the EU accession it is not necessary to pursue 
speedy EMU membership. For example, CNB Board member M. Erbenova argues that given the worrying 
developments in public finance, the Czech Republic should maintain monetary-policy independence for several 
years after EU accession (Svoboda, May 23, 2001). 
The English version of the paper originally published in the journal Finance a úvěr  (www.financeauver.org), vol. 51, 2001, no. 9, pp. 472–487 
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accession, the CNB’s inflation target and the Maastricht criteria will set limits for maximum 
permissible inflation. Only after the EMU accession will these constraints on inflation and price level 
convergence disappear. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This article discusses monetary policy issues that arise in connection with the expected entry 
of the Czech Republic into the EMU. The paper first discusses the disinflation path specified in the Czech 
National Bank’s (CNB) long-term monetary strategy, and the quantification of inflation corresponding to price 
stability. 
Considered next is the issue of what room exists for price level convergence between the Czech 
Republic and the euro area in the period before and after EMU membership, either by means of a higher rate 
of inflation or by means of a nominal appreciation of the Czech koruna. The author concludes that the CNB’s 
long-term inflation target, and institutional constraints regarding prices and nominal exchange rate movements in 
the period before joining the EMU, should not seriously limit the possibility of price level convergence. 
Lastly, the author briefly describes the mutual compatibility of the Maastricht criteria under 
the condition of the rapid growth of labor productivity. During the pre-accession EU period, and during ERM II 
membership, nominal exchange rate flexibility will be sufficiently large to absorb any inflationary effects related 
to the relatively high growth of labor productivity. 
The English version of the paper originally published in the journal Finance a úvěr  (www.financeauver.org), vol. 51, 2001, no. 10, pp. 528–541 
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Measuring Monetary Conditions in the Czech Republic 
 
Anne-Françoise BLÜHER* 
 
 
This essay describes, firstly, the main channels of monetary policy from a theoretical point 
of view. The monetary conditions index (MCI), originally constructed by the Canadian central bank is 
considered at length. This MCI will be modified and applied to the Czech Republic. Next, possible 
implications for Czech monetary policy are investigated. After a critical examination it seems that 
MCI may be used as broad reference variable for the development of aggregate demand. However, it 
might be insufficient as an operational target for monetary policy for the Czech National Bank, which 
targets internal price stability. 
 
1.  Theoretical background: channels of monetary policy1 
Output gap (the difference between production potential and demand) and expected inflation 
are the important driving forces behind inflationary pressure – when domestic demand exceeds 
domestic production capacities, it leads to inflationary pressure. Central banks tend to focus 
on the development of demand, which is a key determinant of changes in the output gap, whereas 
demand is largely influenced by monetary conditions. By means of money instruments, which affect 
demand via monetary transmission, central banks seek to control the development of aggregated 
demand. According to Mishkin (1996), we may summarise the monetary transmission process into 
aggregated domestic demand mainly along three channels: traditional interest-rate channels, asset 
price channels, and credit channels. 
According to traditional interest-rate channels, monetary expansion leads to a fall in real 
interest rates, which lowers the cost of capital. This causes a rise in investment spending (in business, 
but also affects private household decision making regarding residential housing investment and 
durable expenditures), which triggers demand. Real long-term interest rates, and to a lesser extent also 
the real short-term interest rates, are generally seen to play a major role in investment decisions. 
Monetary expansion can lead to a decline in real interest rates via a decline of nominal interest rates 
and/or via a rise in the expected inflation rate. 
This traditional interest channel focuses only on one asset price, the interest rate. Two other 
key assets receive substantial attention in economic literature, according to Mishkin (1996), 
the foreign-exchange rate and equities. 
Monetary expansion leads to a decline in domestic real interest rates. By that, domestic 
deposits become relatively less attractive than deposits denominated in foreign currencies, which leads 
to net capital outflow, resulting in a depreciation of the exchange rate – ceteris paribus. Depreciation 
of the exchange rate triggers a rise in net exports and, hence, in demand. According to the second asset 
price channel, monetary expansion causes a rise in equity prices. Higher equity prices lead to a rise 
in investment spending as companies are able to buy new investment goods with a small issue 
of equity. Furthermore, an alternative channel occurs via the wealth effects on consumption, as 
the financial wealth of households rise, which leads to an increase of household consumption, hence 
boosting aggregate demand. 
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1
 See also Mishkin (1996). 
Finance a úvěr, 51, 2001, No. 10  2 
The credit channels are partly related to the fact that, with monetary expansion, banks’ 
reserves and deposits grow, which increases the quantity of bank loans available, but which arises also 
as a result of information problems in credit markets, according to Mishkin (1996). (The information 
problem also refers to the costly verification and enforcement of financial contracts.) The lower the net 
worth of business firms, the more severe the adverse selection and moral-hazard problems are in 
lending to these firms.2 
Monetary expansion causes a rise in equity prices, i.e., the net worth of firms. This, 
on the other hand, decreases adverse selection and moral hazard. Secondly, monetary expansion, 
which lowers nominal interest rates, improves firms’ balance sheets because it increases cash flow, 
thereby reducing adverse selection and moral-hazard problems. Thirdly, monetary expansion can lead 
to an unanticipated rise in prices, which decreases the value of companies’ liabilities in real terms, 
which, in return, means a rise in firms’ real net worth. And again, adverse selection and moral hazard 
is reduced. Through all these channels monetary expansion leads to higher investment spending, 
which triggers demand. The credit channel should also apply in analogy to consumer spending, 
particularly as regards consumer durable goods and housing. In contrast, a financial crisis sharply and 
severely increases asymmetric information problems of the type described above. 
 
2.  The monetary conditions index (MCI)3  
Central banks, which seek an objective of price stability, face the issue of a time lag between 
the implementation of monetary-policy instruments (e.g., the setting of key interest rates) and 
the realization of the effect. Therefore, central banks use indicators which stand between 
the instrument and the ultimate goal, e.g., an operational target, which is directly and mainly 
influenced by central-bank instruments. Usually short-term interest rates are used as operational 
targets. However, the Canadian central bank, the Bank of Canada (BoC)4, argues that in the case of 
a floating exchange rate, it is preferable to use the monetary condition index (MCI). “First, in flexible 
rate regime monetary policy operates through two channels – the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
Since the relative movements of the two variables will depend on market responses to Central Banks 
actions, they can differ appreciably in different circumstances. Second, if there are exogenous shocks 
to the exchange rate, monetary policy actions should typically offset their effects on aggregate 
demand.” (Freedman, 1996, p. 73) 
The concept of the monetary condition index was introduced by the BoC. The MCI itself is 
not deduced from a structural model, but it aims to aggregate and to reflect changes in the monetary 
conditions which result from changes in the real effective exchange rate and in real interest rates. 
The MCI is the weighted sum of the change in the short-term real interest rate relative to a base period 
and the percentage change of the real effective exchange rate relative to a base period. The base period 
is chosen arbitrarily, therefore the absolute level of the MCI has, in fact, no interpretation. Only 
the changes compared to the base period indicate if the monetary conditions have relatively eased or 
tightened. 
The relative weights for the Canadian MCI for the aggregation of these two factors are based 
on empirical research carried out by Duguay (1996). According to Duguay “[...] the transmission 
mechanism starts with the influence of monetary actions on interest rates and the exchange rate and 
from there goes on to the effect on aggregate demand and supply and to the adjustment of prices and 
costs.” (Duguay, 1996, p. 88). Instead of estimating a large structural macromodel5, which would specify 
                                                          
2
 Adverse selection and moral-hazard problems are due to asymmetric information. 
3 Compare Freedman (1996). 
4 The Bank of Canada’s objective is to reach a rate of inflation within target bands six and eight quarters in 
the future. 
5 Peeters (1998) investigates the interest- and exchange-rate transmission channels in large macroeconometric 
models, i.e., in NIGEM (developed at the National Institute in London) and EUROMON (developed at 
the Dutch Central Bank). 
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the components of GDP explicitly and which would describe the interest- and exchange-rate 
transmission in detail, Duguay argues that an aggregated approach yields much more robust and more 
significant estimates. (Duguay, 1996, p. 92). For the estimation of the effect of real interest-rate changes 
and real exchange-rate changes on total spending he uses a single equation, which is interpreted as an 
aggregate demand equation. The following is a representative regression from that paper, which is 
often quoted.6 
 ∆yt= + 0.13 + 0.52∆yt* + 0.45∆yt-1* - 0.40∆rt + 0.15∆st 
 (1.0) (4.8) (4.2) (1.8) (1.3) 
 
 R2=0.64 DW=1.96 
 
where: 
∆y = growth rate of Canadian real GDP, 
∆y* = growth rate of U.S. real GDP, 
∆r = 8-quarter moving average of quarterly change in short-term real interest rates 
(the 90 day commercial paper rate minus the four-quarter growth rate in GDP deflator, 
lagged one quarter), 
∆s = 12-quarter moving average of the rate of growth in the real exchange rate between 
Canada and the United States (based on GDP deflators). 
The series are all quarterly data from the first quarter 1980 to the fourth quarter 1990.  
 
These results of Duguay´s estimations were used by Freedman (1996) for the official 
introduction of the monetary condition index (MCI) in 1994. Duguay´s results suggest that “[...] a one 
percentage point increase in short-term interest rates has the same effect on spending over time as 
a 3 per cent appreciation of the currency” (Dunguay, 1996, p. 104). This relation has been chosen by 
the Canadian central bank for the MCI (Freedman, 1996, p. 75), i.e.,  
MCI =  [real interest rate at time t – real interest rate at base period] + 1/3[(real effective 
exchange rate index at time t/real effective exchange rate index at base period)-1]*100 
 
3.  The construction of the modified MCI 
The channels of monetary transmission described in the above chapter on the theoretical 
background reveal that “traditional” MCI includes the interest-rate channels and the asset-price 
channel via the exchange rate, but it does not incorporate credit channels. Therefore, the “traditional” 
MCI will be enlarged to the “modified” MCI by a variable, i.e., the real credit volume, to incorporate 
the credit channels as well. 
MCI =  wi*[real interest rate at time t – real interest rate at base period] + we*[(real effective 
exchange rate index at time t / real effective exchange rate index at base period)-1]*100 + wc*[(real 
credit volume at time t / real credit volume at base period)-1] * 100 
In the following sections, first the data for the quantification of the variables will be defined 
and, afterward, the relative weights for a Czech MCI will be assessed.  
                                                          
6 Compare (Duguay, 1996, pp. 94–97. 
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3.1  The interest-rate channels 
The interest-rate channels refer mainly to the impact of changes in the real interest rate on 
fixed capital investment activity. Investment decisions are rather long-term directed; therefore, 
investors primarily take long-term interest rates into account. On the other hand, the interest rate 
should be close to the monetary instruments of the central bank and, therefore, short-term interest rates 
are often used as an operational target of policy. For the construction of a modified MCI for the Czech 
case, something in-between has been chosen – a 1-year PRIBOR rate.  
Company investment represents the major part of investment into tangible goods in the Czech 
Republic, i.e., almost 70%. Hence, for the quantification of the real interest rates, the industrial 
producer price index (PPI) y-on-y rate was chosen because the business sector is confronted more with 
producer than consumer price development. 
Fixed-capital investment (excluding changes in stocks) represented around 30% of real GDP 
in the Czech Republic during recent years. In previous years, about 20% of investment into tangible 
goods was made by the public sector – this share is less subject to changes in real interest rates, but is 
sensitive to budgetary considerations, i.e., to political decisions. Even though the share of investment 
in GDP is relatively large compared to other countries, the share of GDP is not the only determinant 
which is important; we have to ask how sensitive investment spending is to changes in real interest 
rates.  
 
GRAPH 1  Real interest rate in % (inverted left scale) and fixed capital investment in % (right scale) 
 
 
Although some empirical research7 suggests that the response of investment to price variables 
(which also includes interest rates) tends to be small and unimportant relative to quantity variables 
(such as GDP growth), the graph 1 suggests that there might be a relationship between investment 
activity (measured as the y-on-y changes in real fixed capital investment, GDP definition) and real 
interest rates (measured as 1Y PRIBOR minus PPI y-on-y rate) in the Czech Republic. The correlation 
coefficient result is only 0.60. 
3.2  The credit channels 
Changes in the real volume of credits seem also to play an important role in the Czech 
economy. The nominal volume of credits represented more than 60% of nominal GDP The correlation 
coefficient between changes in the real credit volume and real fixed capital investment is 0.63, which 
does not suggest a strong relationship – graph 2. 
                                                          
7 See for example Chirinko (1993). 
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GRAPH 2  Real volume of credits (left scale) and fixed capital Investment in % (right scale) 
 
 
Changes in the volume of real credit and changes in real interest rates may exhibit a negative 
relationship, i.e., falling real interest rates lead to an increase in real credit volumes. Such dependence 
between these two explanatory variables would lead to the problem of multicollinearity, i.e., a notable 
loss in the quality of the regression analysis undertaken for the assessment of the relative weights.8 
However, changes in credit volumes are also dependent on other factors. Mishkin (1996) explains that 
credit volumes also rise and fall, for example, because of information asymmetries, adverse selection, 
and moral-hazard problems. Dornbush et al. (1998) found significant differences in monetary 
mechanisms across Europe, depending on a country’s financial structure, i.e., if companies are rising 
capital on capital markets, such as in Great Britain, or if banks are providing credits, which is more 
often the case in continental Europe. Dornbush et al. (1998) mention also that there is evidence that 
the role of collateral in the provision of bank loans differs significantly across Europe, that 
the tightness of relationships between banks and firms and the degree of competition in the European 
banking industry play an important role, especially in the timing of the response of bank lending rates 
to changes in the interest rates controlled by the central bank. Therefore, it seems probable that in 
the Czech Republic the structure and the process of transformation of the financial sector may play 
a significant role in the transmission mechanism as well.9  
To avoid the problem of multicollinearity a regression analysis of changes in real credit 
volumes on changes in real interest rates was concluded. 
  ∆ct= 2.05     +      1.41∆rt-12 
    (4.36) (10.69) 
 
  R2 = 0.63 DW = 0.30 
                                                          
8
 See also (Johnston, 1972, pp. 159–168. 
9 The “small” and the “large” amendment to the Banking Act in 1998, which where mainly directed to solve 
the problems arising from the close inter-relationship between banks and enterprises, should have had an effect 
strengthening the supervisory power of the Czech National Bank (CNB) and to improve bank governance. In 
addition, the CNB was gradually tightening prudential regulations, bringing them in line with Basle Committee’s 
recommendations and European Union banking directives, which were restricting the banks’ ability to grant 
credits. Furthermore, bank privatization reduces the political influence on banks’ credit policy and the economic 
recession was devaluating collaterals backing loans. All these factors where influencing the banks’ credit-
granting behaviour. 
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where: 
∆r = change over 12 months in %-points of the real short-term interest rates (the 1year 
PRIBOR minus the producer price index y-on-y rate), 
∆c = y-on-y change in the real credit volumes in the Czech Republic (based on the producer 
price index y-on-y rate).  
 
The values below the estimated coefficients are the t-statistics. 
The estimation is based on time series, i.e., monthly data from January 1995 till August 2000. 
 
GRAPH 3  Real volume of credits (change y-on-y) and real interest rate (delta y-on-y) 
 
 
Not only is the adjusted R2 statistic, 0.30, relatively small, but more worrying is that 
the coefficient of the changes in real interest is positive, which would mean that, with rising real 
interest rates, the real credit volumes are increasing (see also graph 3). This contradicts economic 
theory. Due to this result, it is assumed that the volume of real credits and real interest rates do not 
indicate a strong dependency in the Czech Republic, and that the changes in real credit volumes and 
the changes in real interest rates can be used as explanatory variables without running the risk of 
multicollinearity.  
3.3  The exchange rate channel 
The Czech economy is a very open economy. Total exports and total imports each represent 
more than 70% of real GDP. Therefore, one can assume that changes in the real effective exchange 
rate may show a strong impact on the external trade balance and, with it, on real GDP growth. 
The graph 4a,b reflects the development of the real effective exchange rate and the real trade balance. 
For the quantification of the real effective exchange rate, the Czech crown/German mark exchange 
rate was used. Although, per definition, this is not the effective exchange rate, it should be a relative 
good proxy because more than 60% of imports and exports in the Czech Republic are accounted for by 
EU countries, i.e., countries whose currencies are stable vis-à-vis the German mark, previously due to 
the ERM, and, since 1 January 1999, due to the EMU.  
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GRAPH 4a, b 
Real exchange rate (CPI) (left scale) and real trade balance (right scale) 
 
 
Real exchange rate (PPI) (left scale) and real trade balance (right scale) 
 
 
Czech and German consumer price indices were used toward the measurement of inflation 
differential; however, it has to be taken into account that prices of non-tradable goods went up by 
more than the prices for tradable goods in the Czech Republic, mainly because of the price 
deregulation. Therefore, the Czech consumer price index might overstate price development in 
the Czech Republic, which is relevant for the evaluation of the impact on the trade balance. 
The graph 4 suggests some relationship, but the correlation is not that strong, reaching only 0.49. 
The real exchange rate, deflated by Czech and German producer prices, does not suggest a better fit 
(see graph), and the correlation coefficient is only slightly higher: 0.52.  
 
3.4  Assessment of the relative weights 
The next step is the selection of the relative weights wi, we  and wc. A regression analysis was 
carried out toward the quantification of the weights. Analogous to the research paper of Duguay 
(1996), an aggregate demand equation for the Czech Republic was estimated, yet changes in real 
credit volumes were included as an explanatory variable.  
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An estimation, which included real GDP figures for Germany, has not only shown that 
the coefficient of y-on-y change in German real GDP is close to zero, but is also insignificant. 
Therefore, this coefficient has been set equal to zero. This result seems at first glance surprising, as 
Germany is the most important trading partner of the Czech Republic (from 1995 to 1999 exports to 
Germany represented 38% of total Czech exports and imports from Germany represented 32% of total 
Czech imports in average). Tomšík (2000), for example, determines that the income elasticity of 
Czech exports with respect to German GDP is greater than its price elasticity, which suggests that 
the development of the German economy has a strong impact on Czech exports. Hlušek and Singer 
(1999) too separately estimated import and exports equations toward constructing a forecasting model 
for changes in the Czech external trade deficit. But Hlušek and Singer (1999) use German import 
data instead of German GDP data, mainly because GDP data are available with a long time delay and 
therefore is not an appropriate explanatory variable for their forecasting model. Hlušek and Singer 
determined that these two equations did not adequately forecast change in the Czech external trade 
deficit and constructed another model, which focuses directly on changes in the Czech external trade 
deficit. Interesting in the context of this paper is that Hlušek and Singer’s forecasting model for 
changes in the external trade deficit does not include German imports as an explanatory variable 
anymore. Their estimated equation for changes in the Czech external trade balance contains as 
explanatory variables only changes y-on-y in the Czech crown against the USD and DEM, difference 
y-on-y in the amount of working days, and, although only slightly significant, the growth of Czech 
retail sales (which was an explanatory variable in the import function). These findings suggest that, 
although the development of the German economy bears a strong affect on Czech exports, it is 
difficult to find an affect on net exports. 
Due to the already short length of the time series, no quarterly moving averages were 
computed as Duguay (1996) did, but some variables were lagged as the change in the explaining 
variable may take time to show a effect in real GDP. 
 ∆yt= 2.01    +     0.17∆et-1 –   -0.95∆rt-4 + 0.31∆ct 
   (3.9) (2.2) (-6.7) (4.6) 
 
 R2 = 0.76 DW = 2.48 
 
where: 
∆y = y-on-y change of Czech real GDP, 
∆r = y-on-y change in %-points of the real short-term interest rates  
(the 1 year PRIBOR minus producer price index y-on-y rate), 
∆e = y-on-y rate in the real exchange rate between the Czech and German currencies 
(based on the consumer prices index y-on-y rate), 
∆c = the y-on-y rate in the real credit volumes in the Czech Republic  
(based on the producer price index y-on-y rate).  
 
The values below the estimated coefficients are the t-statistics. 
The estimation is based on time series, i.e., quarterly data from the first quarter 1995 to 
the second quarter 2000.  
 
The estimations, including the real exchange rate based on the Czech and German PPI, 
resulted in similar coefficients, but the coefficient was not significant. Therefore, the real exchange 
rate based on the consumer price index was chosen. 
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All estimated coefficients have the expected signs. With rising real interest rates, real GDP 
growth slows, and with a rising real exchange rate – i.e., with a weakening of the Czech crown against 
the German mark in real terms, or with a rising credit volume in real terms – real GDP growth rises. 
The 95%-confidence interval of all estimates is relatively narrow in comparison with other findings 
(Ericsson et al., 1998, pp. 248–260) – table I. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
variable estimated 
coefficient 
lower level of the 95%-
confidence interval 
upper level of the 95%-
confidence interval 
intercept 2.01 0.93 3.09 
real exchange rate 0.17 0.01 0.33 
real interest rate -0.95 -1.25 -0.65 
real volume of credits 0.31 0.17 0.45 
 
 
GRAPH 5  Real GDP growth (left scale) and modified MCI (inverted right scale) 
 
 
The significance of all coefficients is satisfactory, as well as the fit of the estimated equation 
(adjusted R2 = 0.76). The relative size of the coefficients suggests that the weights should be roughly 
1/6/2 with respect to the real exchange rate, the real interest rate, and to the real credit volumes. 
Despite the fact that the resulting relative weights look atypical for an open economy such as 
the Czech Republic’s, many studies found a much higher weight for the real interest rates than for 
the real exchange rate, even for open-economy countries – Ericsson et al. (1998, p. 244) provide 
a good overview of the empirical findings. In addition, the modified MCI with the estimated weights 
exhibits a relative good fit (see the graph 5 also). Furthermore, the results for the modified MCI look 
relatively good in comparison with the results from other investigations (compared with Ericsson et 
al., 1998, p. 244). However, it has to be emphasised that the time series are very short, which makes 
the results of regression analysis less reliable. Furthermore, the Czech economy is subject to much 
structural change, which raises questions about the stability of the coefficients – therefore, the results 
have to be interpreted with caution. 
Finance a úvěr, 51, 2001, No. 10  10 
 
4.  Evolution of the modified MCI 
1995: The modified MCI indicates a loosening of monetary conditions throughout 1995 
compared to the beginning of the year. Real interest rates declined and the volume of real credits rose. 
These expansive effects were only slightly offset by the appreciation of the real exchange rate – 
graph 6a,b,c,d. 
1996: The modified MCI indicates a notable tightening of monetary conditions during 1996 
compared to 1995. While the volume of real credits continued to grow steadily, real interest rate rose 
notably during the first half of the year and the real effective exchange rate appreciated strongly 
throughout the whole year. 
1997: The modified MCI reflects the Czech Republic’s currency crisis during the spring of 
1997 (the strong depreciation of the CZK and the jump in interest rates). Even though interest rates 
came down again after the currency crisis abated, real interest rates rose notably the whole year. 
The real volume of credits stopped growing following the currency crisis and the Czech crown 
depreciated quickly. With the resignation of the Cabinet at the end of 1997, interest rates rose again 
and the Czech crown weakened further in real terms. After all these ups and downs, the modified MCI 
indicates that monetary conditions were tighter at the end of 1997 than at the end of 1996. 
 
GRAPH 6 
Modified MCI 
 
 
 
Real interest rate (change with respect to the base period) 
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Real exchange rate (CPI) (change with respect to the base period) 
 
 
Real credits (change with respect to the base period) 
 
 
 
1998: The modified MCI fluctuated around the level reached at the end of 1997. 
A tightening of monetary conditions stemmed from the appreciation of the real exchange rate but also 
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was due to the stagnation and later decline of the volume of real credits. Yet, in 1998 real interest rates 
declined notably on the year, especially after the CNB started to lower key interest rates. The decline 
in real interest rates was enough to mitigate monetary conditions.  
1999: The real exchange rate depreciated strongly and was the main factor behind 
the significant easing of monetary conditions at the beginning of the year. The CNB continued to cut 
key interest rates during the year and real interest rates fell further, easing monetary conditions as well. 
This was only partly compensated by a further decline in the volume of real credits and by a re-
appreciation of the real exchange rate later that year, so that modified MCI indicates relaxed monetary 
conditions at the end of 1999 compared with the end of 1998.  
2000: The year 2000 can be said to be a year of stabilization; the MCI indicates that 
the monetary conditions have had a similar impact on the economy as at the beginning of 1995.  
 
5.  Evaluation 
MCI has been criticised in the literature for many reasons. Partly because the construction of 
the MCI leaves its specification ambiguous and as its econometric estimations have shown to be very 
sensitive to quantification (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999, p. 56). 
Ericsson et al. (1998, pp. 246–248) criticise several underlying assumptions of MCI. First, 
the relationship between monetary-policy instruments, the exchange rate, the short-term interest rate, 
output, and inflation generally are dynamic. Second, the data might be integrated, which would mean 
that a cointegration analysis should be undertaken. Third, the postulated exogeneity of monetary-
policy instruments and other variables can be misleading, as it assumes, for example, no feedback 
effects from aggregate demand or inflation onto exchange and interest rates. Also, causality between 
these variables has to been investigated. Fourth, parameter constancy is critical for MCI interpretation, 
eespecially in a country such as the Czech Republic, which is undergoing important structural 
changes, the stability of the estimated coefficients is doubtful. Fifth, other potentially important 
variables are omitted, which may have an important impact on aggregate demand, such as (mentioned 
above) the stance of fiscal policy or international demand, but also world oil and commodity prices, 
which may alter a country’s terms of trade. 
Questionable is also whether MCI, as well as modified MCI, is a sufficient indicator for 
the stance of monetary policy for an inflation-targeting central bank. Duguay (1996) estimates 
a relatively simple version of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, which serves as his model 
for an explanation of inflation. He uses lags of price inflation to describe persistence in the inflationary 
process. In addition, he adds lags of the real exchange rate, lags of the real oil prices, changes and lags 
in indirect taxes to explain changes in the price level (Dunguay, 1996, pp. 100–102). Duguay’s 
regression analysis does not include the MCI itself. Therefore, the relation between inflation and MCI 
has not been explicitly tested, only indirectly, i.e., MCI has not reflected changes in the potential 
output, but only changes in aggregate demand. As a consequence, MCI can not be used as a substitute 
for output gap, which, however, is the central idea of the Phillips curves, i.e., price changes traced 
back to existing output gaps.  
Freedman (1996) argues that in Canada “[…] it is the output gap, along with expected 
inflation, that is the principal driving force behind increases and decreases in inflationary pressure and 
it is changes in aggregate demand that are a key determinant of changes in the output gap.” (Freedman, 
1996, p. 76). Even if in the short run it might be suitable to assume that changes in the potential output 
stem mainly from changes in the aggregated demand, for the interpretation of MCI its own 
construction has to be taken into account as well. MCI is referring to a base period, i.e., it measures 
the degree of easing or tightening of monetary conditions from a base period. Yet if, for example, 
the potential output rises with the years as a result of structural change, an easing in monetary 
conditions would ceteris paribus not lead to higher inflationary pressure because the economy, with its 
higher productions potential, would be able to cope with looser monetary conditions. This in turn 
means that the farther ago the base period the higher the risk that the interpretation of MCI with 
respect to inflationary pressure can be wrong. 
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Furthermore, it has to be emphasized that some important explanatory variables, such as 
international demand and the development of central-government finance, can have an important 
impact on changes in the aggregated demand too, although they are not included in the MCI. 
The Bank of Canada’s quarterly staff projections take such external factors additionally into account 
(Freedman 1995, p. 54). The direct impact of the changes in the exchange rate on prices through 
import prices is not explicitly included in the MCI. Also, other factors – commodity prices, indirect 
tax changes, deregulation and inflationary expectations – an have an important impact on price 
development and are not reflected, at least not directly, in the MCI. As a consequence, it may be 
misleading to use the MCI as a tool for inflationary forecasting, because to explain domestic price 
development further facts must be taken into account.  
Taken into account all shortcomings the MCI, which are also valid for the modified MCI, it 
follows that the index may be used only as a broad reference variable for the future development of 
aggregate demand. Therefore, the MCI and the modified MCI should be taken as rough indicators of 
potential price pressure, which may stem from the production gap. Both the MCI and the modified 
MCI seem to be insufficient to serve as operational targets for monetary policy for a central bank 
targeting price stability, such as most are. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This essay initially describes the main channels of monetary policy from a theoretical point of view. In 
the following, the monetary condition index (MCI), originally constructed by the Canadian Central Bank, is 
described. This MCI will be enlarged to the modified MCI, which will then be applied to the Czech Republic. 
Possible implications for monetary policy are investigated next. After a critical examination it seems that both 
the MCI and the modified MCI may be used as broad reference variables for the future development 
of aggregate demand. However, as it stands, it might be insufficient as an operational monetary-policy target for 
the Czech National Bank, which concentrates on internal price stability. 
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1.  Forces shaping the system: past, present and future 
 The tax system in the Czech Republic is broadly similar to that observed in many OECD 
countries and it carries relatively few vestiges of the pre-transition system. A fundamental reform was 
passed in 1992 by the Czechoslovak Parliament but entered into force only in 1993, after the break up 
of the country into the Czech and Slovak Republics.1 The new system is based on the same principles 
as those of mature market economies and in its main features, its structure compares with those of 
most OECD countries. The overall tax burden is about average, although it is much higher than 
the levels observed when other OECD countries were at similar stages of development.2 The tax mix 
is fairly diversified, with personal income, social security contributions and consumption taxes 
accounting for the major part of revenues. By international comparison, the share of corporate income 
tax is average, while those of consumption and social security contributions are high (taken together 
they account for more than 75 per cent of total tax revenues). Individual income taxes represent 
a smaller proportion of tax revenues than in most other countries, while that of other taxes, including 
those levied by local governments (property taxes and other fees) is very small (Table 1). 
 Tax revenues, as a share of GDP, have declined in each year since the establishment of 
the Republic, and are now close to the OECD average (Figure 1). Most of the fall reflects reductions 
in corporate income tax receipts, following the lowering of rates from 42 to 35 per cent between 1994 
and 1998,3 and a purposeful narrowing of the tax base. Collections from indirect taxes and property 
taxes have also fallen, while social security contributions have remained a relatively stable share of 
GDP. Revenues from personal income taxes have increased substantially but, because the authorities 
sought to reduce the overall tax burden, these increases did not fully compensate for the losses from 
other revenue sources. 
                                                     
*
 OECD (andrew.burns@oecd.org) (chiara.bronchi@oecd.org) 
1
 Both the Slovak and Czech Republics adopted the 1992 Czechoslovak legislation. Since then, subsequent modifications 
have caused the legislation in each country to diverge increasingly. 
2
 In 1997 the tax GDP ratio of the Czech Republic was 36 per cent. Of the five non-transition OECD countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Korea, Portugal and Spain) which have or had a similar or lower level of income compared to that in the Czech 
Republic in the preceding 35 years, all had lower average tax burden at that time than the Czech Republic does now. Their 
aggregate tax rates ranged between 17 and 24 per cent and averaged about 20 per cent. Looking at the remaining OECD 
countries, their average tax burden in 1965 was 28 per cent at a time when their incomes were on average twice as high as 
those currently observed in the Czech Republic. 
3
 It was 42 per cent in 1994, 41 per cent in 1995 and 39 per cent in 1996 and 1997. 
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TABLE 1  The structure of taxation by type of tax – 1997 
 Corporate 
income 
taxes 
Individual 
income tax 
Social 
security and 
payroll taxes 
Consumptio
n taxes 
Other taxes, 
including 
property 
taxes 
 Per cent of total tax revenue 
United States 9.4 39.0 24.2 16.7 10.7 
Japan 15.0 20.5 36.9 16.5 11.0 
Germany 4.0 23.9 41.6 27.7 2.8 
France 5.8 14.0 43.0 27.9 9.3 
Italy 9.5 25.3 33.6 25.9 5.8 
United Kingdom 12.2 24.8 17.2 35.0 10.9 
Canada 10.3 38.0 15.5 24.4 11.7 
Australia 14.6 42.0 6.7 27.5 9.2 
Austria 4.7 22.1 40.4 28.2 4.6 
Belgium 7.5 31.0 31.8 26.7 3.0 
Czech Republic 8.6 13.5 43.9 32.6 1.4 
Denmark 5.2 52.4 3.7 33.0 5.7 
Finland 8.1 33.4 25.2 30.9 2.5 
Greece 6.4 13.2 32.2 41.0 7.2 
Hungary1 4.9 16.8 36.3 39.3 2.7 
Iceland 2.8 32.8 8.8 47.5 8.2 
Ireland 10.0 31.4 14.0 39.7 4.9 
Korea 10.5 17.1 9.1 45.4 17.9 
Luxembourg 18.5 20.4 25.4 27.0 8.7 
Mexico1 18.9 14.8 22.1 39.3 4.9 
Netherlands 10.5 15.6 41.0 28.0 5.0 
New Zealand 10.6 43.2 1.0 34.6 10.6 
Norway 12.2 25.7 22.4 37.0 2.7 
Poland 7.7 21.5 32.9 34.9 3.1 
Portugal 10.9 17.7 26.0 42.0 3.4 
Spain 7.8 21.9 35.0 28.9 6.3 
Sweden 6.1 35.0 32.5 22.3 4.1 
Switzerland 5.9 31.2 36.9 18.3 7.7 
Turkey 5.7 21.7 14.5 37.1 20.9 
Average OECD2 8.8 26.6 26.1 31.3 7.2 
Average G72 9.5 26.5 30.3 24.9 8.9 
Average EU(15)2 8.5 25.5 29.5 30.9 5.6 
Note: Consumption taxes equal total taxes on goods and services less “profits of fiscal monopolies” and other “taxes”. 
1  1996 data. PEMEX revenues have been excluded from consumption taxes. Individual and corporate taxes have been 
estimated as well as payroll and property taxes. Unallocated state and municipal tax revenues have been included. 
2 Excluding Mexico. 
Source: OECD (1998b) – Revenue Statistics. 
 
Looking forward, tax policy will be driven by a number of issues. Perhaps the principal one is 
the necessity of meeting the harmonisation criteria for EU accession. At the moment, the most serious 
changes involve the alignment of a number of indirect taxes (VAT and excise rates) with EU norms. In 
addition, there are numerous smaller fine-tuning tasks that need to be accomplished but which will 
undoubtedly take time. Over the medium term, the tax-system faces important challenges emanating 
from the changing nature of the Czech economy. Its reliance on indirect taxes and payroll taxes from 
dependent employment means that the rise in unemployment and fall in labour force participation of 
the past few years have had a strong impact on the overall tax base. Similarly, the decreasing 
importance of large-scale manufacturing firms in the economy and the concomitant rising share in 
total output of small service-sector firms implies increases in the cost and complexity of tax 
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administration.4 An additional transitional pressure is likely to flow from the newly introduced 
regional level of government. For the moment, the full range of its tax powers have not been specified 
(see OECD, 2001) but this change will certainly play a role in the future development of tax policy in 
the Czech Republic. 
FIGURE 1  Total tax revenue 
 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics (1998c) 
 
Over the longer term, the tax system will face increasing pressure to meet growing expenditures 
from existing entitlement programmes. As indicated in OECD (2000 and 2001), an ageing population 
and a relatively generous pension scheme that is indexed on wages rather than inflation will impose 
considerable additional demands on the system. By the same token, health spending can be expected 
to increase as the population ages. While improved productivity performance and the general process 
of catch up in the economy will counterbalance these pressures somewhat, they are likely – 
nonetheless – to require some hard decisions concerning spending. A more fundamental and longer-
term issue concerns the creation of fiscal conditions that will maximise the speed with which living 
standards converge to those in western Europe. While international evidence is not conclusive and 
the issues involved extend well beyond distortions created by the tax system, high levels of 
government spending (and taxation) have often been found to be associated with slower economic 
growth (Bleaney et al.). With standards of living in the Czech Republic some 40 per cent lower than in 
the rest of the OECD, the need to keep economic distortions and other impediments to growth at 
a minimum is of primary importance if convergence is to be achieved within a reasonable time frame. 
The following section presents an overview of the main features of the personal income and 
consumption tax systems, and of the administration related to these taxes. The third section provides 
a review of the key issues that need to be addressed in improving the system, while the final section 
outlines the main options for reform. 
2.  Main features of the personal tax system 
2.1  Personal taxes 
The personal income tax system (PIT) applies a progressive rate schedule to all earned income5 
and income from some other sources (principally intellectual property and rents from secondary 
                                                     
4
 The smaller size of the average reporting unit and the overall increase in their number implies the large losses of economies 
from scale.  
5
 However, the taxable base of the self-employed may be determined as the difference between the income and the related 
deductible expenses. Alternatively, the taxpayer may opt for a lump-sum deduction of expenses from income as defined by 
the tax law. 
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dwellings). The schedule comprises five income brackets with rates ranging from 15 to 40 per cent, 
the number and level of top rates having been reduced since its original implementation in 1993. 
A wide range of tax allowances, awarded on the basis of marital status and family size, helps to 
promote horizontal and vertical equity. Standard deductions range from 18 to 58 per cent of 
the earnings of an average production worker (APW).6 The degree of progressivity in the system is 
about average, with the top 20 per cent of wage earners paying 46 per cent of all personal income 
taxes (Figure 2, Panel A). However, as compared with most OECD countries relatively few taxpayers 
are exposed to top rates and not all personal income is taxed according to this schedule. Distributed 
income from capital holdings is taxed under a separate flat-rate regime at rates ranging between 0 and 
25 per cent depending on the manner in which the income concerned is distributed (Table 2). These 
rates are low by international comparison and are substantially below the top income tax rate. 
Nevertheless, the after-tax distribution of taxable income in the Czech Republic is among the most 
evenly distributed in the OECD area (Figure 2, Panel B) principally reflecting the evenness of the pre-
tax distribution of income. 
In addition to personal income taxes, labour income is subject to social security taxes. The entire 
social security system was described in detail in OECD (1998a) and progress in its reform since then 
is discussed in OECD (2000 and 2001). The various compulsory contributions that are part of it were 
first introduced in 1993 and the aggregate contribution rate, both statutory and net of other taxes, is 
among the highest in the OECD area (Table 3). Only healthcare payments are earmarked 
contributions. Payments from the other social security taxes enter general revenues and over the period 
1993–98 receipts from these sources have exceeded expenditures on the programmes that carry their 
names by 14 per cent.7 Social security contributions represent the largest and a growing share in 
government revenues, having increased between 1993 and 1997, from 38.6 to 43.9 per cent – well 
above the OECD average of 26 per cent. 
                                                     
6
 In 2000, each taxpayer was entitled to a basic personal allowance of Kc 34 920 (about 18 per cent of the earnings of 
an average production worker). An additional allowance of Kc 19 884 was granted for a spouse living in the taxpayer’s 
household if the spouse’s annual income did not exceed Kc 34920. Further, an allowance of Kc 21 600 was granted for each 
dependent child. 
7
 This surplus would leave place to a deficit of 10 per cent if other social benefits such as the child allowance and 
administrative costs were added to the expenditures. Moreover, it is expected that rising joblessness will mean that, in 2000, 
expenditures on the pensions, employment policy and sickness benefits will exceed revenue from the payroll taxes. 
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FIGURE 2  Tax and the distribution of income 
 Notes: The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, the higher the coefficient, the wider the income distribution.
   Data are for 1996 or nearest year available. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998. 
 
Employee and self-employed contributions are fully deductible from the personal income tax base 
and employer contributions are fully deductible from the corporate income tax base. The total 
contribution rates applied to wage and self-employed income are the same (except that for the latter 
participation in the sick-leave programme is optional), but the base upon which they are levied differs 
importantly between the two groups. For the self-employed the contribution rates are applied to only 
35 per cent of self-employed income, subject to both ceilings and floors8, whereas all of an employee’s 
earnings are taxed without reference to floors or ceilings. 
                                                     
8
 The effect of the floor is that no self-employed worker pays less social security contributions than would a minimum wage 
worker. On the other hand, the amount of contributions paid by a self-employed person affected by the ceiling is the same as 
paid by an employee earning about 2.6 times an average production worker’s salary. 
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TABLE 2  Principal statutory personal income tax rates 1 
Income Tax base Tax brackets Tax rates 
Lower threshold as 
a percentage of 
APW wage 
0–102 000 15 0 
102 001–204 000 20 0.65 
204 001–312 000 25 1.3 
312 001–1 104 000 32 1.99 
1. Income 
from 
labour 
Wage income, 
occupational pensions 
and income from 
entrepreneurial activity 
net of deductible 
expenses Above 1 104 000 40 7.03 
2. Distribu-
ted income 
from 
capital 
Dividends and other 
income from profit 
distribution 
 25 per cent                  
final 
withholding 
tax 
 
 Interest payments from 
deposit accounts and 
saving books 
 15 per cent                  
final 
withholding 
tax 
 
 Capital gains  Exempt 
(under 
certain 
restrictions) 
 
 Dividends and interest 
paid by a Pension Fund 
and annuities paid by 
private pension 
schemes 
 15 per cent                     
final 
withholding 
tax 
 
Note:  1  Data are for 1 January 1999. 
Source: OECD; Ministry of Finance 
 
2.2  Value-added tax 
With few exceptions, Czech value-added tax (VAT) rules follow the EU model. VAT is charged 
on all taxable transactions, including domestically-produced supplies in kind, and imported goods. 
Exported goods are zero-rated while small firms, financial and social-security services are exempt.9 
The tax is imposed at an internationally high standard rate of 22 per cent (down from 23 per cent prior 
to January 1995) although it falls within the recommended interval of the EU. There is a reduced rate 
of 5 per cent which, in an apparent effort to serve redistributive goals, is applied to an exceptionally 
wide range of “socially sensitive” items10 including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical products,  
TABLE 3  Social security contributions of top income wage earners – 19981 
Employee contributions Employer contributions Country Legal rate Net rate2 Legal rate Net rate2 
United States 1.453 1.45 1.453 0.88 
Japan 12.75 cap 27.75 13.88 
Germany 14.25 cap 20.75 cap 
France 13.60 7.60 35-454 20.42-26.25 
Italy 9.19 4.96 38.905 21.99 
United Kingdom 10.006 cap 10.00 6.90 
Canada 2.80 cap 2.90 1.54 
Australia 1.50 1.50 n.a. n.a. 
                                                     
9
 A zero rating implies that companies can claim refunds of the tax paid on their inputs and that no VAT is paid on their sales. 
In contrast, exemption implies that VAT is paid on the inputs of a firm but not on its own value added. Firms with an annual 
turnover in excess of Kc 3 million or whose three-month turnover exceeds Kc 750 000 must register in the VAT system; 
smaller firms pay VAT only on their inputs. As compared with other OECD countries, this threshold is relatively high. 
10
 However, most of these low-rated items do not fall in the seventeen “socially and culturally sensitive” categories 
recognised by the EU. 
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Austria 17.157 cap 17.65 11.65 
Belgium 13.07 5.10 35.068 20.98 
Czech Republic 12.50 7.50 35.00 22.75 
Denmark 9.00 3.70 0.33 0.22 
Finland 8.05 4.54 28.70 20.66 
Hungary 11.50 1.50 40.64 32.88 
Iceland n.a. n.a. 5.83 4.08 
Ireland 6.75 2.25 12.00 cap 
Korea 2.30 1.38 10-40 6.88-27.54 
Luxembourg 10.70 cap 16.35 cap 
Mexico 5.25 cap 18.95 12.51 
Netherlands 7.65 cap 19.80 cap 
New Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Norway 7.80 7.80 15.51 11.17 
Poland n.a. n.a. 48.00 30.72 
Portugal 11.00 6.60 23.75 14.87 
Spain 6.40 cap 30.80 19.77 
Sweden 6.95 cap 38.66 27.84 
Switzerland 13.40 7.52 6.55 4.38 
Turkey 14.00 6.30 25.00 14.00 
Notes:  1  Data are for 1 January 1998. 
2  The net rate differs from the legal rate wherever employee’s contributions are deductible from the personal income tax 
and employer’s contributions are deductible from the corporate income tax, and whenever a ceiling applies. 
3  For wages in excess of $68 400 only the Medicare tax applies. For wages below $68 400 the rate rises to 7.65 per 
cent because it includes social security contributions at a rate of 6.2 per cent. 
4  Employer’s contribution rates vary between 35 and 45 per cent, depending on the wage level and the type of 
employee. 
5  A supplementary contribution to the work injury fund (INAIL) of 1 per cent is compulsory for manual workers. 
6  The rate is 2 per cent on the first £62 per week and 10 per cent on the next £403 per week, up to the upper earnings 
limit of £465 per week. 
7  Blue collar workers must pay 17.7 per cent. In addition certain employees must pay a state union contribution (0.5 per 
cent) and a bad weather contribution (0.7). Employers face a 18.2 per cent rate for blue collar workers. 
8  This rate applies when there are more than 19 employees and is 33.25 when there are fewer than 10. For firms with 
between 10 and 19 comployees the rate is 33.25. 
Source: OECD, European Tax Handbook, 1999. 
 
telecommunications, heating fuels, construction and most services.The wide range of activities exempt 
from VAT or subject to reduced or zero rates means that the effective VAT rate (the ratio of VAT 
revenue to consumption) is low by international comparison as is the productivity11 of the tax 
(measured as the ratio of the effective to the statutory rate).12 
2.3  Administration and enforcement 
The administration of the tax system is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. Overall, its 
task is greatly simplified by the system’s reliance on withholding taxes for personal income on the one 
hand and the relatively high threshold for VAT-payers on the other. Nevertheless, the cost of running 
the system is considerable (2.6 per cent of revenues in 1998) with more than half that amount 
accounted for by the collection of indirect taxes. Increasingly, the Czech tax authorities are 
introducing the most modern tools in their efforts to enforce compliance. Thus, all tax subjects – legal 
entities or physical persons – have a taxpayer identification number which is used by 
the administrative authorities and electronic means are being used to detect individuals or firms who 
                                                     
11
 The IMF reports a measure of the productivity of VAT defined as VAT revenues divided by GDP divided in turn by 
the statutory VAT rate. This measure gives a sense of the additional revenue that could be expected from a percentage point 
increase in the VAT under some very strict assumptions. The measure reported here is somewhat more informative and has 
a clear economic interpretation – as it measures the ratio between actual VAT revenues and the revenues that would be 
expected if the VAT were successfully collected at its standard rate on all consumption goods. It therefore indicates 
the extent to which exemptions, zero-rating, reduced rates and tax evasion erode revenues. As such it is also an approximate 
measure of the distortions that these deviations from the standard rate introduce. 
12
 In 2000 a small set of additional goods and services were subjected to the standard rate increasing, marginally, 
the productivity of the VAT. 
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are suspected of under declaring their incomes or evading taxation entirely. Nevertheless, 
the government is increasingly concerned that some firms and workers are avoiding taxes and 
compulsory social security contributions by under reporting their wages. The self-employed are 
responsible for their own assessment and are a particularly difficult category of taxpayer to monitor. 
Here, the authorities compare data from various administrative databases (such as business permits, 
municipal fee records) to identify self-employed individuals who are not paying tax. Despite these 
efforts, tax arrears represent a growing problem for the economy. By the end of 1998 they accounted 
for Kc 114 billion or 6.4 per cent of GDP and their share in GDP has increased at an accelerating rate. 
Total arrears increased by 26 per cent in 1998 or 16 per cent in real terms, with arrears in all tax 
categories growing faster than nominal GDP (Table 4). 
TABLE 4  Breakdown of accumulated tax arrears 
 Increase over previous period1 Increased arrears as per cent of tax due2 
 
Increase 
1993–96 
Increase 
1996–97 
Increase 
1997–98 1996 1997 1998 
Value added tax 42.7 20.6 22.1 5.5 3.7 4.6 
Excises 113.9 32.4 4.2 3.0 3.2 0.5 
Corporate tax 37.0 16.0 68.4 3.7 1.8 6.8 
Wage tax 52.1 70.1 57.1 2.7 2.8 2.5 
Road tax 4.2 39.1 34.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Inheritance tax 95.7 21.5 29.4 1.1 1.2 1.5 
Gift tax 283.1 2.3 18.0 61.6 4.1 21.8 
Real property transfer tax 133.0 55.9 38.2 12.6 14.5 12.5 
Real property tax 8.6 24.5 28.8 1.5 3.2 4.4 
Customs duties -10.2 0.9 52.7 -0.5 0.1 4.1 
Social security 
contributions 92.9 48.1 22.4 3.6 4.1 2.7 
Other taxes 52.8 49.5 31.1 5.4 81.8 87.4 
TOTAL 54.2 33.7 26.1 3.8 3.7 3.5 
Notes: 1  The first three columns show the percentage increase in tax arrears over the stock of tax arrears of the previous period. 
2  The second set of columns shows, for each tax, the annual increase of the stock of tax arrears over the total tax due in 
the same year. The total tax due is calculated as the sum of yearly tax revenues and the yearly increase of the stock 
of tax arrears. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, OECD 
The second set of columns in the table represent a lower estimate of the share of taxes due that are 
unpaid each year.13 On average at least 3.6 per cent of taxes went unpaid in 1998 and the addition to 
arrears was 1.4 per cent of GDP. In some categories of taxation, these rates are alarmingly high 
suggesting that failure to collect taxes in the past may be generating a vicious circle of non-payment. 
The authorities argue that as much as 50 per cent of these arrears are uncollectable, reflecting unpaid 
taxes of failed companies. However, their data systems do not, as yet, permit them to identify this 
component, making it impossible to verify the claim. Moreover, even if this figure is accurate, the rate 
of increase in arrears remains problematic. 
                                                     
13
 This is a lower estimate because the numerator includes the sum of additional non-payment less payments on pre-existing 
arrears. 
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3.  Problems with the system 
3.1  The ov